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Welcome to our first special issue of CTX, “Social Media in Jihad and 
Counterterrorism,” which is devoted to a wide-ranging exploration of social 
media and counterterrorism. Social media have become valuable tools for 
combating crime and terrorism. According to LexisNexis® Risk Solutions, 
four out of five respondents to their survey of law enforcement professionals 
reported using social media, particularly Facebook and YouTube, to aid 
investigations. One officer said he believed his department’s use of social 
media allowed personnel to defuse a terrorist threat involving students at a 
local high school. Two-thirds said they thought access to social media helps 
solve crimes more quickly.
To better understand the role of social media in combating terrorism, the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California held a small 
workshop on Social Media and Counterterrorism this past June. Sponsored 
by the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, the workshop brought 
together a diverse group of people, including researchers, law enforcement 
and military officers, and media experts from the United States, Ireland, and 
the Philippines. Participants were invited to submit papers for inclusion in 
this special issue of CTX.
We are delighted to present here six papers that we received from partici-
pants of the workshop. In addition, we have included a seventh paper that 
was submitted independently to the journal, but which fit well with the 
workshop theme of social media and counterterrorism.
The first piece, “The New Battlefield: The Internet and Social Media,” by 
Maria A. Ressa, CEO and executive editor of the online social news source 
Rappler, describes the role of social media in the jihad in the Philippines. A 
veteran journalist who served many years as CNN’s bureau chief in Manila 
and then Jakarta, Ressa’s article is an expanded excerpt from her book 
10 Days, 10 Years: From Bin Laden to Facebook. 
The next two articles focus on the online social environment associated with 
the global jihad. “From al-Zarqawi to al-Awlaki: The Emergence and De-
velopment of an Online Radical Milieu,” by Dr. Maura Conway of Dublin 
University, discusses the online radical milieu that gives rise to violent jihad. 
Conway shows that many of the characteristics found in traditional radical 
milieus also appear in the online versions, although the latter have unique fea-
tures as well. She also observes that even so-called “lone wolf” terrorists these 
days are at least partially the product of some kind of online radical milieu.
“Rethinking the Role of Virtual Communities in Terrorist Websites,” by 
Dana Janbek of Lasell College in Massachusetts and Paola Prado of Roger 
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Williams University in Rhode Island, examines the extent to which terrorist-related websites have embraced interac-
tive Web 2.0 applications that build community through commentary, social networking, and streaming video. 
Janbek and Prado found that for the most part, the sites they evaluated did not fulfill this function, offering instead 
static, tightly moderated, and effectively closed environments that sought to inform, persuade, and transmit a 
particular message rather than support the free exchange of ideas.
The fourth article, “Countering Individual Jihad: Perspectives on Nidal Hasan and Colleen LaRose,” by Peter Kent 
Forster, considers two cases where individuals embraced a violent jihadist ideology on their own, but then were 
incited to commit violence through their online interactions or, using Conway’s terminology, through their online 
radical milieus. Like Conway, Dr. Forster shows that “lone wolf” jihadists rarely act in isolation, and argues that it 
might be possible to prevent terrorist acts by examining online activities for signs of intent to commit terrorism.
In “Artisanal Intelligence and Information Triage,” Aaron Weisburd, founder of Internet Haganah and director of 
the Society for Internet Research, discusses how a forensic exploration of social media can detect unknown terrorists. 
Drawing on his own experience in counterterrorism and intelligence-related activities, Weisburd offers a targeted 
approach that focuses on the social network, using a variation of “snowballing” along with information triage.
Some of the workshop participants examined the application of social media beyond the scope of counterterrorism. 
The sixth piece, “Another Tool in the Influencer’s Toolbox: A Case Study,” by LTC Jamie Efaw and SFC Chris-
topher Heidger, describes how social media can be used to influence a population at risk from radical messaging. 
Building on Efaw’s earlier research on the application of social media to counterterrorism, the authors describe a 
project that successfully leveraged a Facebook site in order to reach, engage, and influence a target audience.
The final article, “Mining Twitter Data from the Arab Spring,” by Rob Schroeder, Sean Everton, and Russell Shepherd 
of NPS, uses social movement theory to explain how Twitter may have played a role in the Arab Spring. By analyzing 
Twitter data from the period between December 2010 and Fall 2011, the researchers found that activists’ use of Twitter 
may have facilitated the framing of grievances that resonated with their target audiences and helped inspire action.
In keeping with our theme, Sean Everton next delves into the State of the Art of dark networking. Even as social 
media offer us more and more opportunities to connect with friends, relatives, and colleagues around the world, 
they give terrorists, insurgents, and criminals the same easy means to connect and coordinate and plan. Meanwhile, 
the security sector is becoming increasingly skilled at extracting useful information from basic social media data. 
Without trying to guess where this spiral may lead in the longer term, Dr. Everton gives those of us who update our 
status or retweet something clever plenty to think about.
In this issue, we are happy to welcome Bradley Strawser, a new contributor to our regular Ethics column. Dr. 
Strawser tackles the topic professionalism, its origins in three ancient professions (not including the one some of you 
are thinking of ), and then offers some ideas about how it applies to the military. 
The book review by Joey Wang, The Harkis: The Wound that Never Heals takes us back a few decades to the end of 
the Algerian War of Independence, and the plight of the Harkis, Algerians who chose to join the French and fight 
against the insurgency. Largely ignored by the French after the war and targeted for death by the new Algerian 
regime, the survivors and their children tell anthropologist and author Vincent Crapanzano their story of betrayal 
and resignation.
As always, we encourage you to submit your work to CTX for review. See the back page of the journal for submission 
guidelines and make sure to note our new email addresses.
ELIZABETH SKINNER 
Managing Editor
DOROTHY E. DENNING 
Distinguished Professor, Department of 
 Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School 
Chair, Workshop on Social Media and Counterterrorism
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COVER PHOTO
Cairo, Egypt–February 9, 2011: A man works on a Toshiba com-
puter during anti-government demonstrations in Tahrir Square. 
Social networking and the internet played an important role in the 
Egyptian Revolution. Photo by Joel Carillet via iStockPhoto.com.
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On November 6, 2011, a Filipino man with long hair uploaded a 
three-minute, twenty-second video on YouTube, the world’s second larg-
est search engine. It was a video of himself, wearing a camouflage jacket 
and a mask covering his face and head. He was speaking in Arabic and 
asking Muslims around the world to support and contribute to the jihad 
in the Philippines. Identified as Commander Abu Jihad Khalil al-Rahman 
al-Luzoni, the man in the video called on Muslims to unite and help their 
brethren, saying there was “no way to restore the Islamic Caliphate and the 
glory of the religion but through jihad.”2
It was the first of its kind for the Philippines, triggering a wave of video clips, 
letters, and audio messages from Filipino jihadists, which were promoted on 
al Qaeda linked sites and jihadist websites like Shumukh al-Islam and Ansar 
al-Mujahideen English Forum. They declared allegiance to al Qaeda online 
and on social networks.
Intelligence sources from at least three different countries told me that the 
man with the long hair—Abu Jihad Khalil al-Rahman al-Luzoni, who also 
went by the shorter pseudonym Abu Jihad—is 31-year old Khalil Pareja, a 
Christian convert to Islam who took over the leadership in 2005 of the Rajah 
Solaiman Movement (RSM), also known as the Rajah Solaiman Islamic 
Movement. RSM worked closely with the groups Abu Sayyaf, a violent 
Islamist insurgency in the southern Philippines, and Jemaah Islamiyah, al 
Qaeda’s arm in Southeast Asia. Their alliance carried out numerous attacks, 
including the Superferry bombing in 2004, one of the world’s worst mari-
time terrorist attacks and the second most lethal in Southeast Asia since the 
2002 Bali bombing; and the Valentine’s Day bombings in 2005—two near-
simultaneous explosions in General Santos City and Davao City, followed an 
hour later by an explosion on a bus in Makati.
A Philippine intelligence report obtained and verified by Rappler said that 
Pareja not only posted jihadi materials on YouTube, he was also active on 
Facebook—a case study of how one man can connect jihadists and terrorists 
from multiple countries through social media.3
About a month before he posted his YouTube video, Pareja told authorities, 
he joined the Arabic Student Forum on Facebook. Several of the members 
asked him if he knew Abu Jihad, but he said he was cautious about security 
so he pretended to know nothing. Then he received a private message online 
from a man who introduced himself as Gerald.4 They became friends and 
started chatting through private messages regularly. Over time, Gerald told 
Pareja he was a member of al Shabaab, a group of Islamist militants that con-
trols much of southern Somalia.5 The relationship between al Shabaab and 
The New Battlefield: The Internet and Social Media1
Maria A. Ressa
Pareja not only posted jihadi 
materials on YouTube, he was 
also active on Facebook.
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al Qaeda dates back to the 1990s, when al Qaeda began providing funding 
and training to the Somali fighters. It seems Osama bin Laden’s death in 
2011 helped pave the way for closer ties between the two groups. In February 
2012, al Shabaab’s leadership pledged allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, who 
replaced bin Laden as al Qaeda’s new leader. This was announced on a video 
uploaded to the internet by al Qaeda’s media arm. This agreement showed 
that despite bin Laden’s death, al Qaeda continues to spread.6 
Pareja told Gerald he was Abu Jihad. Gerald invited him to go to Yemen 
to join the jihad led by al Qaeda’s Yemeni affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula or AQAP. Counterterrorism officials and analysts characterize AQAP 
as the “most active and lethal Qaeda affiliate, intent on striking at both the 
U.S. homeland and regional targets.”7 In mid-2012, authorities used a CIA 
sting operation to foil an AQAP plot to bomb U.S.-bound airplanes with 
explosives hidden in the bodies of terrorists. Experts said AQAP’s master 
bomb-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, had been working on body bombs, surgically 
implanted explosives in the stomach or rectal cavity. AQAP was also involved 
in other foiled plots against U.S. targets: the “underwear bomb” used in an 
attempt to take down Northwest flight 253 in 2009, and the “printer bombs” 
in the failed cargo bomb plot in 2010.8
One of AQAP’s leaders, American Anwar al-Awlaki, was a “master in the use 
of the Internet,”9 and although he was killed by the United States in 2011, his 
messages continue to resonate and win recruits online. Awlaki was prolific 
on YouTube; among those he influenced were the London attackers who car-
ried out simultaneous subway and bus bombings on July 7, 2005 (commonly 
referred to as 7/7, or “Britain’s 9/11”). He had his own website (now taken 
Al Shabaab’s leadership 
pledged allegiance to al-
Zawahiri on a video uploaded 
to the internet by al Qaeda’s 
media arm.
Anwar al-Awlaki was a 
“master in the use of the 
Internet.”
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down by authorities), which attracted extremists including the head of AQAP, 
bin Laden’s secretary, Nasir al-Quhaishi. Al-Quhaishi consulted bin Laden 
and appointed Awlaki the head of AQAP’s external operations, in charge of 
terrorist attacks outside Yemen and Saud Arabia; this was his position when 
he was killed by a drone strike while in Yemen. Awlaki became a cyberworld 
superstar because he was an eloquent speaker and understood how to use so-
cial media. His ideas were incorporated by AQAP, which continues his online 
recruitment efforts. Eleven years after 9/11, al Qaeda is degraded, but it has 
evolved into a social movement. It continues to spread its virulent ideology, 
now in the virtual world and on social media. This is the new battlefield.
Pareja said Gerald told him AQAP “had established an Islamic state in the 
province of Abian in Yemen,”10 and had already recruited “Filipinos studying 
from the Islamic schools in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan.”11 Gerald asked 
Pareja to join the jihad in Yemen and help lead the Filipinos. He said they 
would stay in Yemen for ten years. After five years, they could choose to 
return to the Philippines, at which point AQAP “would provide them funds 
to continue jihad to establish an Islamic Caliphate.”12 Gerald offered to pay 
Pareja’s travel expenses to Yemen. Pareja accepted the offer and was sched-
uled to travel between April and June of 2012, but he never made it because 
Filipino authorities arrested him on March 1. 
Pareja’s story doesn’t end with his arrest, however. When he uploaded his 
video exhorting support for jihad in the southern Philippines in 2011, it 
showed him speaking in front of a black flag. Other extremist websites, 
video messages, and social media accounts around the world, including in 
the Middle East, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen, prominently display 
the black flag. In the Philippines, authorities are monitoring 
a website called “Islamic Emirate of the Philippines: The 
Black Flag Movement.”13 One post, titled “The True Islamic 
Hero,” shows a picture of Anwar al-Awlaki as well as other 
al Qaeda operatives, with Arabic titles and translations, 
including “The Martyr of Dawaah.” It includes links to other 
extremist websites, including those run by al Qaeda and its 
proxies. Another entry says: “This is the Truth!” and asks 
the reader to “open your eyes and know the TRUTH that 
the commercial media hides.” It includes news updates as 
well as photographs of a breakaway faction of the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front led by Ameril Umra Kato, 
who sheltered leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah. Other 
photos show Filipinos in the southern Philippines, 
where Abu Sayyaf operates, waving the black flag. 
While all public measuring systems show activity 
on the site isn’t alarming, it provides a gateway 
for radicals: there is a “Contact us” link, an 
online poll, and a donation portal. Although 
it is unclear whether the site’s operators 
have any real-world link to al Qaeda, 
it’s clear they have been inspired by al 
Qaeda lore and its subculture.
The website provides a 
gateway for radicals: there is 
a “Contact us” link, an online 
poll, and a donation portal.
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The black flag taps into a secret motivation of al Qaeda: a “narrative that 
convinces them that they’re part of a divine plan.”14 Al Qaeda’s mythology 
holds that its black banners herald the apocalypse that would bring about 
the triumph of Islam, based on what they believe is a hadith, or 
a saying of the prophet Muhammad: “If you see the black ban-
ners coming from Khurusan, join that army, even if you have to 
crawl over ice; no power will be able to stop them, and they will 
finally reach Baitul Maqdis [Jerusalem], where they will erect 
their flags.”15 Khurusan is a name for a historical region covering 
northeastern and eastern Iran and parts of Turkmenistan, Uzbeki-
stan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and northwestern Pakistan. This is 
where al Qaeda believes the Islamic version of Armaggedon will 
emerge. Osama bin Laden’s 1996 declaration of war against the 
United States ends with the dateline, “Friday, August 23, 1996, in 
the Hindu Kush, Khurusan, Afghanistan.”
In August, 2012, Philippines authorities recovered video explaining 
the black flag’s symbolism on the laptop of a Malaysian jihadist, 
during an offensive targeting Southeast Asia’s most wanted terror-
ists, Jemaah Islamiyah leaders Marwan and Muawiyah. These men 
also were the targets of the first U.S. smart bomb attack in the 
Philippines, February 2012 in Jolo, but both escaped and fled to 
central Mindanao. 
The video found in the laptop verifies what CIA sources and former 
FBI agent Ali Soufan, who has closely studied al Qaeda’s ideology, 
have said regarding the virtual links between jihadists. All this 
brings us back to Pareja. Before he was scheduled to leave the 
Philippines, Gerald asked him to do one more thing: “to establish 
the link between the group of Marwan and the AQAP.”16 Although 
Pareja was arrested before he could do that, it seems someone else 
may have had the same intent. The Malaysian who owned the 
laptop with the black flag video arrived in the Philippines in April 
2012, and found his way to the central Mindanao camp of Marwan 
and Muawiyah. Among the weapons and rocket launchers recov-
ered by authorities when they attacked that camp in August, they 
also found a hardcover book written in English. Its title is “Islami 
Emirate Afghanistan.” Below the title was the logo of the Islamic 
Emirate of the Philippines.
More recently, on September 20, 2012, authorities in the Philip-
pines stormed an Abu Sayyaf training camp in Zamboanga City, 
freeing Chinese hostage Yuan-Kai Lin and seizing a black flag 
they found there. During the twenty-minute battle, police forces 
claimed they wounded Abu Sayyaf leader Khair Mundos, who 
carries a $500,000 reward from the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Mundos had been captured previously in 2004, and confessed 
he arranged funds for terrorist attacks in Mindanao. Working 
with his brothers, he funnelled money from Saudi Arabia to 
the Abu Sayyaf, which has had a historical link to al Qaeda. As 
early as 1988, al Qaeda’s financial network in the Philippines was 
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established by Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, 
and al Qaeda leaders, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the architect 
of the 9/11 attacks, have trained members of the Abu Sayyaf. Mundos 
escaped from prison in 2007 and became head of the the Abu Sayyaf group 
in Basilan. During the September 20 raid, intelligence sources said they 
discovered not only the black flag, but also training manuals from Jemaah 
Islamiyah, once al Qaeda’s arm in Southeast Asia, inside the camp. Mundos 
escaped.
This black flag symbol has resurfaced in high-profile violence since Sep-
tember 11, 2012, the eleventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. On that day, a 
violent mob stormed the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, raised the black 
flag and killed four Americans, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens. 
U.S. officials blamed the violence on an al Qaeda-linked group, which they 
said took advantage of protests against clips from an anti-Islam film that had 
recently spread across the internet to launch an attack. 
In a little more than a week, protests against the film spread to more than 
twenty countries, and more than thirty people were killed. Black flags were 
raised by angry mobs in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. Coin-
cidentally or not, a day before the attack in Libya, al Qaeda leader Ayman 
al-Zawahiri released a forty-two 
minute video confirming the death 
of his deputy, Abu Yahyah al-Libi. 
From Yemen, AQAP said the attack 
in Libya was to avenge the June 
killing of al Qaeda’s number two, 
and urged Muslims to kill U.S. 
diplomats in Muslim countries.
The centralized command struc-
tures of both al Qaeda and Jemaah 
Islamiyah have collapsed in the 
years since 9/11, but remaining 
networks and cells continue to 
spread their virulent ideology, not 
just physically but in the virtual 
world through the internet and 
social media. Smaller, more ad hoc 
and less professional cells carry out 
attacks without central coordina-
tion. The challenge for authorities 
today is how to contain a social 
movement that simmers just 
beneath the surface.
New technology now allows 
jihadists to connect with other 
like-minded individuals from the 
safety of their homes, sitting at 
their computers. Individuals from 
Southeast Asia, Europe, and the 
Jihadists connect with other 
like-minded individuals from 
the safety of their homes, 
sitting at their computers.
Chat rooms and blogs mean 
that jihadists no longer have to 
physically meet.
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United States have become politically radicalized, learned operational details 
like how to make bombs and suicide vests, and connected with others who 
have acted as mentors in their radicalization, all online.17 The chat rooms 
and blogs act as echo chambers. They’re harder for authorities to detect, and 
they mean that jihadists no longer have to physically meet. These individuals 
are free to read, participate, and ask questions in the privacy of their homes, 
lowering the risk of detection. Plus, never before has one platform connected 
so many: Facebook now links together more than a billion accounts. Gerald, 
allegedly recruiting for AQAP, didn’t have to meet Pareja in person in order to 
get him to commit to AQAP’s jihad. 
Let me end with the Facebook page created by Pareja. Filipino authorities say 
one of his “friends” is a Facebook pseudonym used by Marwan, who even 
while on the run updates his page. Pareja has other “friends” from around the 
world, whose pages prominently and publicly display a picture of the black 
flag like a secret code. These are clear visual reminders of how the jihadi virus 
spread through the years, from bin Laden to Facebook. 
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From al-Zarqawi to al-Awlaki: The Emergence and Development of 
an Online Radical Milieu
Milieu: the physical or social setting in which something occurs or 
develops; syn: environment.
 —Merriam-Webster Online, 2012
Radical milieus have been described as specific social environ-
ments whose culture, narratives, and symbols shape both individuals and 
groups, and the social networks and relationships out of which those 
individuals and groups develop and emerge. Researcher Peter Waldmann 
and his co-authors attribute distinct and independent qualities to these 
environments, portraying them as social entities in their own right, that is, 
a collective of people sharing certain perspectives and a unitary identity: a 
“subculture” or a “community.” This does not mean that conflict is absent 
between any given radical milieu and the violent extremist or terrorist 
group(s) that emerges from within it. Milieus have their own interests that 
lead them not just to interact with, but oftentimes to criticise and sometimes 
even confront their violent offshoots. Perhaps most importantly, Waldmann’s 
conception of radical milieus appears not merely to have social relationships 
as a core characteristic, but necessitates, implicitly or explicitly, face-to-face 
interaction amongst the members of any given milieu.1 
Waldmann has raised the question of virtual versus “real world” interaction, 
and the merits or demerits of each, asking whether “the Internet and its 
chat forums offer a substitute to face-to-face contacts as a base of mutual 
support [for violent radicals]?”2 While he doesn’t venture an answer, given 
that the internet, and Web 2.0 in particular, has been shown to facilitate the 
virtual establishment of strong social and personal bonds in many different 
contexts,3 there is no reason to believe that this should not hold true with 
respect to violent political extremists. The purpose of this article is therefore 
to expand the concept of the radical milieu to the virtual sphere by showing 
that many of the basic characteristics of traditional radical milieus are also 
apparent in their online counterparts, while acknowledging the latter’s 
own unique characteristics and complicating factors. The emphasis here is 
on the emergence of the violent jihadi online milieu, although as noted in 
the conclusion, this is probably not the only well-developed online radical 
milieu in existence. 
Shared Characteristics of Online and Traditional  
Radical Milieus
It was the advent of Web 2.0 that offered violent radicals the means to trans-
form their largely broadcast internet presences into meaningful interactive 
radical milieus.4 Osama bin Laden’s cadres had used the internet for commu-
nication and propaganda purposes prior to the attacks in the United States 
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on September 11, 2001, but their use of the internet increased exponentially 
thereafter.5 This had two interrelated causes: 1) the loss of al Qaeda’s Afghan 
base and the consequent dispersal of its leaders and fighters; and 2) the rapid 
development of the internet itself, the global spread of internet cafes, and the 
proliferation of internet-capable computers and other gadgets, such as mobile 
telephones.6 Until the emergence of Web 2.0, with its emphasis on the 
integration of user-generated content, social networking, and digital video, 
bin Laden and “al Qaeda Central” maintained some level of control over the 
al Qaeda narrative. It was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the group al Qaeda 
in Iraq (AQI) who instigated a separate online strategy in the interregnum 
between the sunset of the early Web and the full ascent of Web 2.0, thus 
marking the beginning of violent jihad’s transformation from a movement 
with a significant internet component to a genuine online radical milieu. 
Like traditional radical milieus, online radical milieus are communities 
within which the perpetrators of violence are a sub-group. In other words, 
terrorist groups and violent attacks spring from radical milieus (i.e., these 
are violently radicalizing environments), and therefore terrorist groups and 
attacks can also spring from their online variants. “What distinguishes the 
milieu from simple sympathizers is that within the former, there exists a 
form of social structure responsible for the observed in-group cohesion. It is 
not merely a sum of individuals holding similar political/cultural attitudes.”7 
A violent online jihadi milieu worthy of the name thus emerged when the 
“jihadisphere” came to encompass a wide cross-section of producers and 
consumers, from al Qaeda Central to the media arms of various al Qaeda 
franchise organisations, to the globally dispersed array of “jihobbyists” with 
no formal links to any violent jihadist organisation, all contributing to the 
everyday making and remaking of the violent jihadi narrative.8 
Al-Zarqawi’s Online Exploits as Turning Point
In a little over four weeks in April and May 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
shot to worldwide fame—or more appropriately, infamy—by a strategic 
combination of extreme violence and internet savvy. In early April 2004, 
al-Zarqawi posted online a thirty-minute audio recording that explained 
who he was, why he was fighting, and details of the attacks for which he 
and his group were responsible. Researcher Paul Eedle described the latter 
as “a comprehensive branding statement.”9 The internet allowed al-Zarqawi 
to build a brand very quickly: “Suddenly this mystery man had a voice, if 
not a face, and a clear ideology to explain his violence.” But what was AQI’s 
purpose in building a brand and establishing a public profile in this way? 
The answer, according to Eedle, clearly was to magnify the impact of their 
violence.10 Prior to the initiation of his internet-based public-relations 
campaign, each of al-Zarqawi’s attacks had to kill large numbers of people in 
order to get noticed amid the chaos and mounting daily death toll in Iraq. 
By going online however, al-Zarqawi was able to both control the interpreta-
tion of his violent message and achieve greater impact with smaller opera-
tions. In May 2004, al-Zarqawi pushed the internet’s force-multiplying effect 
to the maximum by having himself filmed personally cutting off the head 
of American hostage Nicholas Berg, and posting the footage online.11 The 
purpose of this beheading was precisely to videotape it. The images gripped 
the imaginations of AQI’s allies and enemies alike. Al-Zarqawi risked nothing 
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in the endeavour, while making himself a hero to jihadis worldwide.12 It 
was only after these online exploits that al-Zarqawi was actually endorsed by 
Osama bin Laden as “Emir” (i.e., leader) of al Qaeda in Iraq. 
Government officials’ and policymakers’ fears of the potential for the 
internet to act as a vehicle for violent radicalisation spring from the alleged 
effects of extreme political violence like al-Zarqawi’s, combined with the 
advantages of the cyber world (e.g., potentially vast audience, geographical 
reach, and multimedia capabilities). Al-Zarqawi was, however, a terrorist 
who migrated some of his activity to the internet, rather than himself 
emerging out of an online radical milieu. It was the legions of fans inspired 
by al-Zarqawi’s online activity who took up the banner of violent jihad 
online, thus generating more of the same, in a spiral effect that eventually 
coalesced into the contemporary violent jihadi online milieu. 
Changes in the Internet Landscape Leading to the 
Emergence of the Violent Jihadi Online Milieu
Al-Zarqawi’s exploitation of the internet wasn’t the only catalyst for height-
ened concern regarding violent online radicalization. The emergence of the 
violent jihadi online milieu was also influenced by changes in the internet 
landscape, in terms of both access and technologies, that were gaining pace 
at around the same time al-Zarqawi’s publicity strategy came to the world’s 
attention. First, large numbers of people gained cheap and easy access to 
the internet. Today, always-on mobile internet access is speedily becoming 
the norm, especially among youth who increasingly go online using mobile 
telephones and other mobile devices. Second, online social networking, an 
integral part of Web 2.0, took off in the mid-2000s. Consider that Facebook 
was established in 2004 and is now thought to have a billion regular users,13 
while YouTube, which only came into existence in 2005, currently has 72 
hours of video uploaded to it every minute.14 It was these changes that 
caused Time magazine to name “You” as their 2006 “Person of the Year,”15 
and it was the same changes that ushered in the violent jihadi online milieu 
instigated by al-Zarqawi. These developments had transformed the internet 
environment by the time al-Zarqawi’s most prominent online successor, 
Anwar al-Awlaki, appeared in 2008.16 
No figure immediately emerged from within the ranks of al Qaeda-affiliated 
groups to fill the cyber-gap left by al-Zarqawi’s death in June 2006. But such 
a figure was no longer integral to the buoyancy of al Qaeda’s online presence. 
Official and semi-official websites were no longer the only important jihadi 
cyber spaces.17 Increasing numbers of violent jihadi websites and amounts 
of content began to be available in English, French, German, Spanish, and 
Dutch, signifying both the rise of violent jihadism in the West and growing 
efforts by violent jihadist voices to reach Western (Muslim) populations 
online.18 Changes in the nature of the internet encouraged increasing num-
bers of supporters of violent jihad to post and re-post articles and analyses, 
exchange information, voice opinions, and debate ideas on blogs, websites, 
and forums that they themselves established. The proliferation of fan sites 
acted as free publicity for the violent jihadi cause. Today, new websites 
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appear—and also disappear—frequently, popular chat rooms have stringent 
admission policies, and most sites display technical savvy on the part of their 
producers, including all the latest internet tools and gadgetry. Al Qaeda did 
not and does not provide financing or have any management role in these 
sites; nonetheless, they act as an invaluable force-multiplier for the group’s 
cyber-based incitement strategy. 
Recognising this benefit, al Qaeda assured its “internet brothers” early on 
that “the media war with the oppressive crusader enemy takes a common 
effort and can use a lot of ideas. We are prepared to help out with these 
ideas.”19 From this came al Qaeda’s official media production arm, largely 
audio and video, known as as-Sahab or “the Clouds” in 2001. Violent jihadi 
online content takes three major forms: basic text, including forum post-
ings, magazines/journals, books, and written statements; audio, such as 
statements by leaders, sermons by violent jihadi preachers, nashid (chants); 
and video. Genres of video include political statements, by al Qaeda leaders 
and Western “spokesmen;” attack footage; “pre-martyrdom” videos, such as 
that made of 7/7 bomber Mohammed Siddique Khan; instructional videos, 
of both theological and military-operational sorts; memorial videos com-
memorating persons and/or events; music videos; and beheadings. With the 
advent of easy digital video composition and fast download, huge amounts 
of violent jihad-supporting video began to be produced, distributed, and 
consumed. Between 2002 and 2005, for example, as-Sahab issued a total of 
45 tapes; there was an exponential increase in 2006, which saw the distri-
bution of 58 productions.20 2007 too was a banner year, with 97 original 
productions.21 As-Sahab began to lose ground from 2008, however, as both 
the quality and volume of their productions decreased. This slack was taken 
up by a host of new producers, including both formal production outfits and 
individual “jihobbyists.” Together these contributions added up to a tremen-
dous input into what Osama bin Laden repeatedly said was his, and remains 
al Qaeda’s, top priority: the instigation to violent jihad of as many Muslims 
globally as possible.22 
This violent jihadi content increasingly migrated to global portals such as 
YouTube, which had the effect of making the content much easier to locate 
for anyone, regardless of Arabic language skills or level of internet literacy. 
Consider too that these global portals are known and attractive to young 
people in particular, and that multi-media content, especially moving 
images, is thought to be more convincing than text in terms of its ability to 
influence. Couple this with the internet’s crowd-sourcing properties, and 
the violent jihadi online milieu is born. Masses of violent jihadi texts that 
were originally produced in Arabic began to be translated into a multitude 
of other languages. Large amounts of violent jihadi video began to have 
subtitles, again in multiple languages, added by fans. All of this modified 
material is then re-uploaded for consumption online, or easy copying and 
dissemination via links embedded in emails and Tweets, instant messages, 
SMS/text messages, etc., but also through VHS tapes, CDs, DVDs, and mobile 
phones.23 The spread of such content across multiple platforms and in 
multiple formats means that it is increasingly difficult to counter, especially 
because portals such as YouTube and Twitter generally cannot be shut down 
in the same way as, for example, jihadi online forums. 
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Critical Voices 
It is important to note here that while radical milieus can be largely charac-
terized as that segment “of a population which sympathizes with terrorists 
and supports them morally and logistically,”24 this support is not wholly 
uncritical: 
[N]otwithstanding their shared experiences and perspective and 
their general approval of violent action, radical milieus do not 
unconditionally support or approve of terrorist groups and their 
violent campaigns. What emerges is a complex and ambivalent 
relationship, which may include interactions and close social ties 
as well as dynamics of separation and isolation; and entails soli-
darity and support as well as controversies and confrontation.25 
The same holds true for online radical milieus. At least one function of 
al-Zarqawi’s original audio statement mentioned above, for example, was to 
alert audiences that he viewed the world rather differently from Osama bin 
Laden, conceiving the enemy to be not just American troops, but also Kurds 
and Shi’ite Muslims. On a different occasion, Ayman al-Zawahiri criticised 
the young online followers of al-Zarqawi for their preoccupation with the 
staging of blood-soaked media spectacles, writing: 
Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who 
love and support you will never find palatable, also, are the scenes 
of slaughtering the hostages. You shouldn’t be deceived by the 
praise of some of the zealous young men and their descriptions 
of you as the Sheikh of the Slaughterers.26
Clearly, the effort put into the production and circulation of “images 
signifying Muslim suffering, Western hypocrisy, Jihadist heroism and so 
on was intended to create effects; to legitimise violence and recruit and 
mobilise supporters,” facilitated by what some analysts term the “new 
media ecology.”27 As the latter also point out, however, the very openness of 
this new ecology led to a loss of control over the “core message” or “single 
narrative,” as new and differing interpretations and conflicting versions of 
the violent jihadi message began to appear, and new figures emerged to 
explicitly challenge the position of al-Zawahiri and others.28 This explains 
al-Zawahiri’s rebuke of al-Zarqawi’s independent, implicitly competing, 
online strategy. 
In fact, in 2006, the violent jihadi media production outlet al-Boraq Media 
Institute published what could be called a “policy document” on this issue, 
entitled Media Exuberance, which sought to curb the uncontrolled and 
“exuberant” production and distribution of violent jihadi fan content.29 
Similarly, the posting guidelines for the al-Faloja online discussion forum 
“primly exhort posters to avoid material likely to give offense or create fitna 
(division) in the community, as well as, interestingly, information on 
subjects such as how to make bombs.”30 Many violent jihadi discussion 
forums are, in fact, tightly controlled in this way.31 One researcher provides 
the example of a conversation on the English-language Islamic Awakening 
forum, in which a member complains of having been ejected from the  
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al Qaeda-affiliated forum Al-Ikhlas, after commenting on al Qaeda in 
Iraq’s tendency to kill Muslims. To this another poster responded that the 
disbarred member deserved it, and that the mujahedeen must be dismayed at 
the persistence of such questions.32 This illustrates another vitally important 
aspect of the contemporary violent jihadi online milieu: It was not inten-
tionally constructed, and thus has aspects that are lamented by some users, 
especially those elements of the movement directly affiliated with al Qaeda, 
but also some of the grassroots.33 Having said this, the concept of the online 
radical milieu draws our attention to the way in which “official” voices must 
now co-exist with “unofficial” ones, or those seeking to seize the mantle of 
officialdom within the jihadisphere. The violent jihadi online milieu is not—
despite the best efforts of some—“owned” or controlled by any one group, 
but encompasses a plurality of overlapping, and sometimes clashing, cyber 
spaces and voices, which contribute to making it a milieu.
Precursor or Credible Alternative to “Real World” 
Activism?
Over time, online jihadist activity came to have standing in its own right 
through popular texts such as Muhammad bin Ahmadal-Salim’s 39 Ways to 
Serve and Participate in Jihad, which extolled “performing electronic jihad” 
as a “blessed field which contains much benefit.”34 In fact, the success of 
violent online jihad led some analysts to contend that, “The virtual or media 
Jihad has not only gained prominence and credibility as a wholly legitimate 
alternative to traditional conceptions of jihad, but has also progressively 
outpaced the militaristic or physical Jihad in the modern era.”35 In other 
words, all of this online activity had the effect of constituting a powerful 
new community, here termed the violent jihadi online milieu, that had to 
be acknowledged by al Qaeda leaders and, indeed, any individual or group 
that wished to play a prominent role within violent jihadism. It was by dint 
of these virtual jihadis’ efforts, at least as much as those purveying solely 
“real world” violence, that violent jihadism continued to prosper from the 
mid-2000s onward. Thence, for example, al-Zawahiri’s agreement to an 
online question-and-answer session in 2007–2008;36 it also explains the 
emergence of Anwar al-Awlaki as a major figure within violent jihadism, at 
least in the West (he does not seem to have been personally known to Osama 
bin Laden).37 Al-Awlaki, an English-speaking Yemeni-American cleric, was 
considered by some, largely because of his video-taped speeches, which were 
distributed online, and his involvement in the publication of Inspire maga-
zine, to be “Terrorist No. 1” in terms of the threat he posed to the United 
States;38 this at least partially explains his targeted killing by a U.S. drone 
attack in Yemen in September 2011. This is a significant development when 
one considers that al-Awlaki was not known to have ever personally engaged 
in political violence. In fact, the killing of al-Awlaki raises a matter of 
ongoing debate: the ability of online radical milieus to produce “real world” 
terrorists. 
Arguments against a prominent role for the internet in violent radicalization 
processes take two main forms. One position holds that claiming violent 
extremist online content radicalizes individuals into committing violence 
makes no sense given that other consumers of the same content do not 
commit violent attacks. Alternatively, it may be argued that while such 
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content can buttress an already sympathetic individual’s resolve to engage in 
violence, it is not generally the originating cause of such a commitment.39 
The second position suggests that most, though not all, contemporary 
violent online extremists are dilettantes, in the sense that they restrict them-
selves to using the internet to support and encourage violent extremism, 
but pose no “real world” threat. Put another way, there is the possibility 
that the “venting” or “purging” political extremists engage in online satisfies 
their desire to act. Their internet activity, rather than becoming an avenue 
for violent radicalization and leading to potential offline action such as, in 
the most extreme instances, large-scale terrorist attacks, instead becomes for 
many a mechanism to dissipate the desire for violent action.40  
The alternative view, of course, is that the violent extremist cyber-world is a 
progressively more important staging post for “real world” violence. Security 
personnel and policymakers appear increasingly swayed by this argument, as 
it relates to violent jihadists in particular. Europol has, for example, described 
the internet as “a crucial facilitating factor for both terrorists and extrem-
ists.”41 Europol’s director general emphasized his belief that the “Internet has 
replaced Afghanistan as the terrorist training ground, and this should concern 
us the most.”42 The British government also underscored that: 
Al Qa’ida and some Al Qa’ida affiliates have increasingly encour-
aged acts of terrorism by individuals or small groups independent 
of the Al Qa’ida chain of command and without reference to, 
or guidance and instruction from, the leadership. The internet 
has enabled this type of terrorism by providing material which 
encourages and guides radicalisation and instructions on how to 
plan and conduct operations. In practice some attacks have been 
conducted or attempted by groups or sole individuals seemingly 
at their own initiative; in other cases they have had some contact 
with other terrorist networks.43
Manfred Murck, head of the Hamburg branch of Germany’s domestic 
intelligence service, has made similar comments: “The tradition of terrorism 
is more or less a tradition of groups. But now we see that the group is not al-
ways necessary and that the Internet functions as a kind of virtual group.”44 
Such concerns have been stoked by a rash of both successful and thwarted 
terrorist attacks in which the internet played a role, including the failed July 
21, 2005 London bomb attacks, the shooting deaths of two U.S. airmen at 
Frankfurt Airport in March 2010, and the so-called “Irhabi007” and “Jihad 
Jane” cases.45 These cases and others have involved internet users who run 
the gamut, from prominent figures in the “jihadisphere” who spent large 
portions of their lives networking, and consuming and producing jihadi 
online content, to youths who entered the violent jihadi online milieu, 
consumed its products—largely or entirely in isolation from other denizens 
of the milieu—and acted on the basis of what they absorbed. 
An example of the former type was Abu Dujana al-Khurasani, a well-known 
administrator of the al-Hesbah jihadi forum, who launched a suicide attack 
at U.S. Forward Operating Base Chapman in Afghanistan in December 
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2009, killing seven CIA operatives and a member of Jordan’s General Intel-
ligence Directorate.46 He was described by his wife as “constantly reading 
and writing. He was crazy about online forums.”47 Al-Khurasani was 
immortalized online after his death in videos, photo montages, and poetry, 
including an ode entitled “Our James Bond.”48 British Muslim student 
Roshonara Choudhry is an example of the other type. She was jailed for life 
in November 2010 for attempting to murder a British M.P. Ms. Choudhry 
claimed she was radicalized over the course of just a few weeks after navi-
gating from YouTube to a stream of videos featuring extremist preacher 
Anwar al-Awlaki.49 
Al-Awlaki was implicated in a number of additional attacks and plots, 
including Major Nidal Hasan’s shooting spree at Fort Hood in 2009, and 
the attempted Times Square car bombing in 2010. Both Hasan and Faisal 
Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, were thought to have been in online 
contact with the preacher prior to their attacks. For many, including policy-
makers and security practitioners, these cases and others like them illustrate 
the violent radicalizing properties of radical online milieus. For others how-
ever, they raise more questions than answers. Up until recently, al-Awlaki’s 
sermons were widely available on mainstream Islamic websites. At the time 
that it came to the attention of U.S. authorities in 2008, for example, his 
popular lecture “Constants on the Path of Jihad” was available on Ummah.
com, a mainstream site that, according to U.S. authorities, was receiving 
approximately 48,300 visits per month from the United States alone.50 Some 
of these visitors must surely have viewed “Constants,” but presumably never 
acted on al-Awlaki’s advice to carry out attacks within the United States and 
abroad. Are direct contacts with violent extremists therefore more important 
than simply consuming violent extremist content? Can this factor explain 
the attacks carried out by Hasan and Shahzad? If so, what about Roshonara 
Choudhry and the influence of al-Awlaki’s video sermons on her decision to 
assassinate a member of the British parliament? 
While such questions cannot yet be adequately answered, outright denials 
of a role for the internet in the process of violent radicalization, such as the 
following quote from Jason Burke, seem to be premature:
Twitter will never be a substitute for grassroots activism. In much 
of the Islamic world, social media is only for super-connected 
local elites or supporters in far-off countries. Neither are much 
use on the ground, where it counts. Social media can bring in 
donations or some foreign recruits. It can aid communication 
with some logistics and facilitate propaganda operations, but it is 
not much use in a firefight with Saudi, Iraqi or Pakistani security 
forces. Twitter won’t help al-Shabaab retake Mogadishu or the 
Taliban reach Kabul in any meaningful way.51
Burke thus seems to dismiss out of hand all those preparatory steps—dona-
tions, foreign recruits, logistics, propaganda—and the potential role of 
violent online radical milieus in facilitating these that together culminate 
in “firefights.” Burke also draws attention to issues of access; in large parts 
of the Muslim world, he says, online social networking is restricted to elites 
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and is thus not “much use on the ground, where it counts.”52 It is certainly 
true that home-based internet penetration rates are low in, for example, the 
Middle East as compared to the West, but internet cafes are widely popular 
and the region is seeing soaring rates of mobile phone usage.  
While widespread fast, always-on internet is doubtless preferable in terms 
of instituting a durable Web-based political violence strategy, it is not 
crucial. The internet, and Web 2.0 in particular, facilitates small contribu-
tions—whether of money, content, or other types of virtual labour—by 
large numbers of people, along with large contributions by small numbers 
of people, that together can constitute a significant whole. Nor is it neces-
sary for all those engaged in any activist project, violent or non-violent, to 
be themselves internet users. Internet-based content can circulate not only 
online, but can also be disseminated via photocopying, audio tapes, VHS 
and CDs, text-messaging, and plain old word-of-mouth, depending on its 
nature. In the context of the present analysis, the violent jihadi online milieu 
is a component of the wider jihadi milieu, with ideas and content from each 
penetrating the other in multiple ways. The same can be said of the events of 
the so-called “Arab Spring,” in which internet tools played an important—
though not determining—role “on the ground” for users and non-users 
alike. The wider Middle Eastern social-political environment is presently 
undergoing seismic changes, which will doubtless also influence the jihadi 
milieu, including its online component, in ways which may or may not be 
conducive to the violent jihadi agenda in the longer term. 
Concluding Remarks
One does not radicalize oneself in cyberspace, any more than one becomes 
radicalized by oneself in the “real world.” The concept of the violent online 
radical milieu emphasizes that although so-called “lone wolf” terrorists—
from Robert Hasan and Arid Uka to Roshanara Choudhary and Anders 
Breivik—may act alone, oftentimes they are at least partially the product 
of some radical online milieu. Hasan, Uka, and Choudhary, as exemplar 
products of the jihadi online milieu, raise a further important concern:  the 
likelihood that the internet plays a greater role in violent jihadi radicalization 
processes in Western countries than in other parts of the world. This would 
seem to make sense on the basis not just of widespread access in the West 
to cheap—often free—fast, always-on internet with less content restrictions 
than in most parts of the Muslim world, but also because it seems less likely 
that persons on the ground in “hot” conflict zones become radicalized via 
their online content consumption and interactions. Their personal experi-
ences are likely to be far more of a catalyst, versus those of people living in 
stable Western countries who come to share the same violent jihadi commit-
ments. This hypothesis needs testing, however. 
It is important to underline that violent radicalization is not something that 
should be explored only in the context of jihadism; thence the mention of 
Anders Breivik, the Norwegian right-wing radical who massacred dozens of 
young people at an island retreat in 2011. What is happening in the Middle 
East or the Muslim world more widely, and how this may affect violent 
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jihadism, both off- and online, should not be our sole consideration. If the 
internet has a role in some violent jihadis’ radicalization processes, then it 
follows that it could play a role in other violent political extremists’ radical-
ization, too. The online strategies of these other violent political extremists, 
including so-called “old” terrorist organizations (e.g., national-separatists 
and ethnic-separatists) and the extreme right wing, therefore need to be 
explored in much greater depth and at much greater length than they have 
been to date. Do these other violent extremist online spaces also constitute 
radical milieus as described herein? If so, why; if not, why not? Consistent 
cross-comparative research of this sort is crucial if we are to accurately 
characterize the role of the internet in violent radicalization.  
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Rethinking the Role of Virtual Communities in Terrorist Websites1
Many security officials, policy analysts, and researchers are 
quick to identify the internet as a powerful terrorist recruiting tool that 
poses a growing security threat. Some worry that rapidly evolving techni-
cal capabilities offer terrorist groups a new strategic weapon with which to 
attack their enemies.2 Al Qaeda and the Zapatista National Liberation Army 
(EZLN) in Mexico were among the first such organizations to lead the migra-
tion of terrorist rhetoric to the Web, spearheading the exponential growth of 
such sites from a mere dozen in 1997 to more than 6,000 today.3 
Researchers have established that most extremist websites seek to fulfill 
five basic goals: to disseminate propaganda, organize the membership, 
communicate information, fundraise, and recruit new members.4 In 2001, 
Jenine Abboushi Dallal suggested that terrorists were embracing the Web as 
a platform from which to recast their images.5 In her view, extremist groups 
went online not so much to engage in dialogue, but rather to offer a “counter 
information system,” and to create a virtual community. Dallal contended 
that these sites were not meant to be participatory or interactive, but rather 
were created to promote a tightly controlled authoritarian narrative.
Given the rapid proliferation of participatory applications on the Web 
in recent years, we set out to examine whether terrorism-related websites 
had embraced the Web 2.0 interactive applications that build community 
through commentary, social networking, and streaming video. Is there 
evidence that the internet has successfully generated virtual communities 
around websites run by terrorist groups? 
To answer this question, between 2009 and 2010 we analyzed the discursive 
strategies and representations of virtual communities on 38 terrorist-related 
websites, 28 published in Arabic and 10 in Spanish (see Appendix A). Our 
content analysis identified in each case: 1) the sender of a message; 2) the 
content of that message; 3) the intended publics (readers of the message); 
and, 4) the interactive and multimedia features available to users of that 
particular website. The 38 websites we coded were filtered from an initial list 
of 80 Muslim-based and 20 Spanish-language extremist sites identified in 
studies conducted since 2000. For the purposes of this analysis, “extremist” 
sites were defined as sites that explicitly endorsed hatred and violence, and 
actively promoted their ideologies online. The filtered core list was expanded 
using the external links on each site, the Google search engine in Arabic and 
Spanish, and the back-link function of BacklinkWatch (this function helps 
researchers determine what websites link to the website they are studying). 
A Terrorist Counter-information System
In 2004, researcher Gilles Kepel wrote: “Al Qaeda was less a military base of 
operations than a database that connected jihadists all over the world via the 
Internet.”6 The hyperlinks that connect the websites of these organizations to 
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one another confirm this argument. Rather than relying solely on real-world 
physical connections, al Qaeda also connects like-minded organizations and 
their members in cyberspace, reinforcing the real-world extremist network 
with a virtual community mirror. Yet the results of our analysis suggest that 
these organizations limit user interactivity in the virtual communities they 
create by maintaining tight control of all discourse, while avoiding the most 
common and popular Web 2.0 interactive applications.
Common Features
Looking through these Arabic- and Spanish-language websites, we saw 
common trends. 
More than two-thirds of the Arabic-language websites and half of the 
Spanish-language ones offered responsive search functions and featured mul-
timedia displays in the form of audio files, video files, pictures, or a combina-
tion of the above. Most of the websites displayed user-friendly navigation, 
ample content, and working hyperlinks that presented a static narration 
of the organization’s mission, history, and goals, in a format that we now 
associate with the early days of the “read-only” Web. Interactive features were 
notably absent from all sites.
Arabic- and Spanish-language websites displayed different categories of 
content in their photos. While all websites showcased images of local people, 
guerrillas, fighters, and clashes with security forces, the Arabic-language 
ones included more graphic photos of blood-spattered bodies and corpses. 
The content of the audio and video files for all websites frequently featured 
talking heads, or a narration that provided a romanticized view of the 
organization and its members. Overall, the websites were user-friendly and 
sought to engage and entertain users by providing multimedia offerings. A 
few of the sites offered variable download speeds, a feature meant to enhance 
the user experience. While the availability of multimedia content hints at a 
level of technical sophistication, however, formatting errors such as broken 
multimedia hyperlinks were plentiful, possibly hinting at a scarcity of 
technical resources. 
As mentioned, interactive features were sparsely available. One-third of 
the Arabic-language websites included listservs, forums, RSS features, guest 
books, or a comments section. None made chat rooms or blogs available to 
users. Five of the ten Spanish-language websites we coded offered users RSS 
feeds and the opportunity to register their e-mail (presumably, although this 
was not clearly stated, for the purposes of joining a mailing list). Only two 
of those five provided fora where users might register their comments; these 
consisted of moderated environments where comments were subjected to 
review and approval prior to publication. Editorial controls on most of the 
38 sites prevented users from posting comments uncensored, and forum rules 
restricted comment threads. Likewise, when sites provided room for user 
feedback, the feedback was sometimes deleted (users complained accord-
ingly). It is thus possible that the organizations allowed like-minded indi-
viduals to post comments but suppressed dissenting views. None of the sites 
provides links to social networking applications and tools, thus discouraging 
users from easily sharing or commenting upon the content. This choice of 
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format and tight editorial control seem to indicate that the primary goal of 
these sites is to inform, persuade, and communicate a structured discourse, 
rather than to engage users in dialogue.
Target Audiences
Of the 38 sites we coded, most consistently proffered a discourse and mes-
sage that resembled those of real-world resistance movements that seek to 
capture the media spotlight through violent acts of terror. Most sites framed 
their overall mission as a struggle to end foreign occupation through armed 
resistance. Prominently displayed banners and seals associated the organiza-
tions with patriotic or religious armed resistance movements. The few sites 
that listed the names of their martyrs and detailed the operations in which 
the martyr died stressed the importance of armed resistance and sacrifice. 
Among Muslim organizations, the farewell videos posted by aspiring “mar-
tyrs” on their websites justified the planned violent suicides by borrowing 
heavily from the Qur’an.
Most of the sites targeted current members and potential recruits, or local 
and international media audiences, with customized messages. News releases 
published online, while ostensibly targeted to the news media, also seemed 
geared to deliver information to current members and potential recruits, 
providing political analysis that countered mainstream news reports. 
Published in a variety of languages, these releases seem to confirm that the 
organizations sought to influence foreign public opinion beyond the Arabic- 
or Spanish-speaking worlds. 
While the majority of the sites seemed to target male users, a notable few had sec-
tions geared to women, and two sites included content meant for children. 
This may indicate the beginning of a shift in the mostly patriarchal groups 
that some researchers identified as predominant on the internet.7 Overall, 
however, the online discourse remains predominantly masculine in tone. 
Multimedia applications provide a compelling alternative to text-based 
content among younger or semi-illiterate audiences. One of the sites offered 
mobile ring tones, confirming its intent to connect to a younger, media 
savvy demographic. The same site boasted mobile video footage, possibly 
indicating the involvement of a younger generation in the production of 
jihadist propaganda. A few sites included user-generated information, but in 
each instance user content was submitted to a moderator for approval prior 
to publication, presumably to allow for editorial control of the narrative and 
censorship of critical or opposing views. 
Research has shown that video and interactive content features and applica-
tions that allow users to stay connected with the organization and interact 
with other members are central to the promotion of virtual community.8 
Such features have been shown to foster virtual ties between the organiza-
tion and its supporters. Yet, the near total absence of interactive components 
in the websites we analyzed is consistent with a “read-only” online environ-
ment, where the narrative is tightly controlled in a way that eschews the 
participatory and community-building capabilities of the interactive Web. 
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Conclusions
Twelve years after Dallal reached her conclusions concerning the limited ways 
terrorists were likely to use websites, it does indeed seem that terrorist groups 
continue to rely on the internet to communicate a “resistant discourse,” and 
propose a counter-hegemonic narrative through a traditional unilinear mode 
of communication. No matter how active or tame their online presence, 
these groups for the most part have yet to leverage the power of interactive 
Web 2.0 applications to create vibrant participatory communities. 
Whereas the rapidly increasing availability of interactive and collaborative 
Web features now allows for real-time dialogue among users worldwide, 
terrorism-related websites remain static, tightly moderated, and effectively 
closed Web environments. They monitor user-generated content, shy away 
from adopting Web 2.0 technologies that enable users to develop unique 
voices or attract a personal following, and curtail messages that contradict 
or challenge the organization’s viewpoint. Forgoing Web 2.0 interactive 
features, these terrorist sites provide a controlled model of information flow, 
a unidirectional narrative that eschews the possibility of dialogue. True to 
their ideological purpose, the sites seek to inform, persuade, and communi-
cate a predetermined message, rather than to offer a public space for the free 
exchange of ideas. The websites thus work to reinforce existing beliefs and to 
connect like-minded individuals in the virtual world. 
For the most part, extremist or terrorism-related websites cater to audiences 
that perceive the underlying organizations as legitimate political movements. 
They publish online content that counters traditional media discourse, 
acknowledges shared grievances, and reframes narratives of political conflicts. 
This content resonates among those who share an alternative worldview that 
more often than not remains marginalized by the mainstream press. Having 
adopted the internet as a strategic tool, these groups offer an alternative 
media source and provide an online forum that engages audiences in a closely 
moderated dialogue. In this corner of cyberspace, like-minded individuals 
share online virtual communities where the narrative rigidly follows the 
ideological party line. 
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APPENDIX A: EXTREMIST WEBSITES ANALYZED IN THIS STUDY9
 Arabic-language websites
1 Islamic Army in Iraq
2 Tawhid and Jihad Forum
3 Islamic Resistance in Lebanon
4 Baghdad Sniper
5 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
6 Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
7 Brigades of the Martyr Ezzedeen Al-Qassam 
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
8 Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
9 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
10 PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
11 Ansar al-Islam
12 The Jihadi Empowerment Network
13 Al-Nasser Salah Addin’s Brigade
14 Jihad and Reform Front
15 Jamaat Ansar Al-Sunna
16 Al-Muslmeen Army in Iraq
17 Army of Saad bin Abi Waqas
18 The Army Men of Al-Nakshabandia Way
19 Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance, Jame3, 
The Brigades of Salah Al-Deen Al-Ayoubi
20 The Islamic Resistence Movement—Hamas 
Iraq—Al-Fatih Al-Islamy Brigades
21 Jihad and Change Front
22 High Command of Jihad and Liberation
23 Al-Rashedeen Army
24 The Brigades of the Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa—Media Site
25 Jihad on the Land of Rafedean Brigades—News Network
26 The Nationalist and Islamic Front
27 Al-Mojahden
28 The Voice of Jihad
 Spanish-language websites 
29 National Liberation Army—Eln Voces 
30 National Liberation Army—Frente de Guerra Oriental
31 National Liberation Army, Patria Libre
32 National Liberation Army, Occidente Rebelde
33 Zapatista National Liberation Army, EZLN
34 Zapatista National Liberation Army, Zezta Internazional
35 Zapatista National Liberation Army Radio
36 Rebeldia Magazine
37 EZLN Letters and Communications 
38 Revolutionary Army of the Insurrectionist People
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In December 2011, U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Na-
politano told an interviewer that the risk of attacks by so-called “lone 
wolves,” individuals with no apparent ties to known extremist networks 
or conspiracies, is on the rise, and is an indication that the global terrorist 
threat has shifted.1 Secretary Napolitano’s statement is a sobering assessment 
of the violent Islamist threat to the United States. While her definition 
characterizes a particular kind of perpetrator, however, in today’s networked 
world the individual is not as isolated, and is perhaps more dangerous, than 
previously assumed. To deal with these changes, new counter-measures need 
to be adopted. 
The internet has been widely recognized as a multi-faceted tool for terrorist 
groups for quite some time, but recent digital innovations such as social 
media networks have improved the virtual connectivity of the individual, 
not simply to an organization but to the entire terrorism process.2 Exem-
plified by the Unabomber, the stereotypical “lone wolf” is a person who 
acts alone without orders or even connections to an organization.3 These 
independent terrorists are still a danger, but access to the internet has given 
rise to others who consciously seek motivation and training online, or 
are systematically identified and cultivated by online facilitators, such as 
spiritual advisers, recruiters, or “link-men,” to pursue violent jihad.4 These 
individual jihadists are not as isolated as we assume the “lone wolf” to be. 
Digital forensics show that their online activities, such as email communica-
tions, on-line searches for information on potential targets, and even online 
ideological statements, create “digital exhaust” that erodes the individual 
jihadist’s anonymity.5
The debate regarding the internet’s effectiveness in inciting an individual’s 
progression from “indoctrination” to “jihadization,” (i.e., violent Islamist 
extremism) continues.6 This article contributes to this debate by examining 
the individual jihad, in which the individual embraces a violent Salafist ide-
ology in his or her personal world, but is ultimately incited to actual violence 
through virtual interactions. It examines this phenomenon’s impact through 
two U.S.-centric cases that provide evidence that on-line “jihadization” can 
occur when inspired or systematically managed by an online facilitator. The 
first explores how virtual interactions contributed to Nidal Hasan’s decision 
to attack fellow soldiers at Fort Hood in November 2009. The second shows 
how internet communications were used to identify, vet, and ultimately 
impel Colleen LaRose to recruit individuals, solicit funds for a terrorist 
organization, and plan an attack. 
A decade after the attacks of September 11, 2001, extreme Islamist terrorism 
reflects the maturation of al Qaeda’s ability to inspire through ideology even 
as the core organization deteriorates. It is the manifestation of an ideological 
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raison d’etre that exploits an environment in which violent Salafism can 
spread, and an individual be incited to act, without any face-to-face interac-
tions. This process is accomplished through a progressive exploitation of the 
internet and associated technologies as powerful tools for communication, 
information sharing, and information analytics. 
Against this background, the following questions provide a context for 
examining the individual jihadist who has a global reach and global connec-
tions through digital media: 
 ¡ How are terrorists using the internet to incite individuals to violence?
 ¡ When does radical belief constitute terrorism and a security issue in 
an online environment?
 ¡ How might counterterrorist experts combat the individual jihad? 
This article challenges some of the traditional perspectives on the role of 
the internet in motivating terrorism. As proposed here, it may be possible 
to prove intent to commit terrorism without waiting for a physical act of 
violence, by assessing the “digital exhaust” from online activities. After dis-
cussing the two case studies of Hasan and LaRose, the article suggests some 
potential counter-strategies available through forensic analysis.
Technology Extends the Jihad
The “multiplicity and interconnectedness of threats and actors,” including 
the fact that small groups have greater access to lethal technologies, is 
considered by U.S. officials to be the most serious danger to U.S. national 
security.7 This reality is not lost on the terrorists. Technology has played a 
role in both al Qaeda’s growth and its devolution. Al Qaeda’s Afghanistan-
based core, responsible for planning and executing terror attacks from 1998 
to 2002, embraced technology both as a media platform and a planning 
tool. The 9/11 Commission Report describes Muhammad Atta emailing 
flight schools to ask the cost of training, and using the internet to conduct 
financial transactions and find housing while planning the 9/11 attacks.8 
After al Qaeda was driven from its Afghan safe haven in 2002, the internet’s 
importance to jihadists increased. Between 2003 and 2007, al Qaeda’s central 
media group grew its operations from six to 97 annual productions, which 
were disseminated primarily via the internet.9 Internet jihadists such Younis 
Tsouli (a.k.a. Irahibi007) and Malika al Aroud used the online environment 
to recruit, propagandize, train for, and conduct cyber-attacks.10 By 2008, 
al Qaeda’s core recognized that the internet reduced the time and costs of 
operational communications while increasing the scope of information-
sharing among geographically disbursed groups.11 The jihadists had shifted 
from being consumers of information to “networked participants.” This 
process has continued and will intensify as operational competency migrates 
to associated movements.12
Osama bin Laden was pre-occupied with attacking the United States, per-
haps to the detriment of considering regional targets and other strategies.13 
His diminished relevance over the past few years and subsequent death, 
however, led to a resurrection of the individual jihad. A primary advocate 
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of this strategy is Abu Musab al-Suri, a strategic-minded, innovative, and 
ideologically grounded al Qaeda leader, who either escaped or was released 
from a Syrian jail in February 2012. Prior to his capture in November 2005, 
al-Suri openly disagreed with bin Laden’s “America first” strategy in favor 
of the individual jihad, the foundation of which is found in his treatise, The 
Global Islamic Resistance Call. His arguments have recently been re-printed 
in the online magazine Inspire, produced by the group al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In these articles, al-Suri extolled the value of 
the individual jihad as a reasonable response to Islam’s “humiliation.”14 He 
declared that military success would result from spontaneous operations that 
confuse local and international intelligence, while such actions would also 
provide operational security for the larger organization by ensuring that the 
disruption of one cell does not influence another.15 The individual jihad 
is, as he described it, geographically independent. As reflected in the 2005 
London bombings, which he masterminded, al-Suri encouraged individuals 
to resist assimilation and participate in jihad where they are.16 He also 
advocated centering the jihad in Yemen.17 His strategy was further endorsed 
by Anwar al-Awlaki, the now-deceased American-born imam and AQAP 
leader, who called upon Muslims in the West to either leave and live among 
Muslims, or stay behind and follow the violent example of Nidal Hasan, the 
individual jihad’s poster child.18 
The online environment is reducing geographic distance, improving security, 
and accelerating the individual jihad. By leveraging connectivity, the virtual 
environment globalizes local issues and creates a broad self-selecting echo 
chamber in which a community forms around shared ideas, indoctrinates 
itself, and blurs the incremental movement from radicalization to violent 
jihad. The echo chamber serves the individual jihad well. It allows individ-
uals to bond virtually to the ideology and religious perspectives of extremists, 
a key part of the training process that usually occurs in the training camps, 
but it does not create the human bond of direct contact.19 Furthermore, 
attacks such as Abdulhakim Muhammad’s on an Arkansas army recruiting 
center in 2009, or Mohamed Merah’s killing of three school children and 
three French paratroopers in Toulouse in March 2012, epitomize the indi-
vidual jihad’s effectiveness, particularly when juxtaposed against the failures 
of centrally planned plots. 
The internet’s anonymity and accessibility also change the operational 
paradigm by providing opportunities for online vetting, training, and opera-
tional direction. Increasingly, Facebook and Twitter serve to re-post mate-
rial and share content more quickly, thus expanding the capability of the 
individual jihad.20 The internet keeps the constituency in constant contact 
with the material and each other, while frustrating attempts by law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies to disrupt access. Leveraging online networks 
is accelerating the linkages between the successors of long-established groups 
with organizational structure (i.e., command and control, and a training 
apparatus), and a new collection of self-radicalized individuals.21 While both 
“lone wolves” and individual jihadists can be characterized as self-recruited, 
leaderless thrill seekers connected via cyberspace,22 the latter participate in 
an interactive online environment with a facilitator, rather than on their own.
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The Individual Jihad: Two Cases 
The individual jihad has many faces and unique operational tendencies. The 
ability of law enforcement and intelligent analysts to recognize a “lone wolf” 
is hindered by a lack of information about the perpetrator, his motives, 
and objectives. As noted by U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman, a “lone wolf ’s” 
available profile typically is limited, attacks are planned without guidance, 
and the lack of co-conspirators makes it less likely that intelligence analysts 
and law enforcement will be able to identify a plot or the plotter prior to the 
attack.23 The cases of Colleen LaRose (a.k.a. Jihad Jane) and Nidal Hasan, 
by contrast, represent individuals who are connected and recognizable. These 
cases provide insight into the individual jihad process in the United States, 
and represent a threat that is contrary to both the conventional wisdom of 
the “lone wolf” and the assumption that face-to-face contact is needed to 
incite effective jihadization. Each perpetrator had ongoing interactions with 
an online facilitator, although the roles of those individuals differed. In the 
Hasan case, Anwar al-Awlaki’s spiritual guidance compelled Hasan to be-
come a jihadi foot soldier. LaRose interacted with a handler who developed 
her as a “manager.”24 While both facilitators sought to channel their charges’ 
desires to participate in violent jihad, the handler in the LaRose case took 
a more active role in vetting his recruit and then operationalizing a plot. 
Together these cases illustrate a variety of virtual interactions, and suggest 
inferences between the online interactions and ultimately violent action. 
Furthermore, a review of the indictments and court transcripts help define 
the legal threshold online interactions must cross to establish terrorist intent. 
Nidal Hasan
U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center 
in Fort Hood, Texas on November 5, 2009, killing 13 and wounding 32 
before being wounded himself and captured. The following brief synopsis 
of events leading up to the shooting focuses on the importance of Hasan’s 
online interactions with al-Awlaki as the catalyst to his jihadization.  
Although Hasan harbored radical ideas prior to renewing communications 
with al-Awlaki in 2008, the online communications are possibly significant 
in his decision to take action. 
Hasan first met al-Awlaki in 2001, while the latter was the imam at the Dar 
al-Hijrah Mosque in Falls Church, Virginia, where Hasan worshiped.25 The 
cleric reportedly presided at Hasan’s mother’s funeral around that time.26 
The death of his mother and his connection to al-Awlaki were possible 
catalysts to Hasan’s radicalization.27 Hasan became increasingly vocal in 
expressing his Islamist beliefs, and his radicalization apparently 
reached a “crescendo” in 2007-2008, when he is believed to have 
published a pamphlet entitled “Martyrdom in Islam versus Suicide 
Bombing;” after that, however, his public displays dissipated.28 
In December 2008, after a seven-year hiatus, he renewed e-mail 
contact with al-Awlaki, and over the next ten months communi-
cated with him eighteen times. At one point, al-Awlaki sent Hasan 
a copy of “44 Ways of Supporting Jihad,” which urges Muslims to 
defend Islam through violence.29 Hasan responded by asking if he 
were allowed to kill fellow soldiers.30 
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While reports indicate that al-Awlaki did not order Hasan to take action, 
when understood within the context of al-Awlaki’s ability to inspire indi-
viduals to violent action, his counsel was likely influential.31 Al-Awlaki had 
inspirational and operational contacts with a range of terrorists, including 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian who tried to blow-up a U.S.-
bound flight from Amsterdam on December 25, 2009, and Faisal Shahzad, 
who tried to set off a homemade car bomb in New York’s Times Square in 
May 2010. Furthermore, al-Awlaki proudly claimed Hasan as “one of his stu-
dents.”32 Finally, a February 2011 report by U.S. Senators Joseph Lieberman 
and Susan Collins clearly indicates that failure by the FBI and the Defense 
Criminal Investigation Service to flag Hasan’s numerous communications 
with al-Awlaki, through which one plausibly could infer the radicalizing 
nature of the relationship, was instrumental in their inability to recognize 
him as a threat.33 
At a minimum, Hasan’s interactions with al-Awlaki were an accelerant to 
jihadization, but how this fact is addressed at trial illustrates a significant 
obstacle to successfully countering the individual jihad. In the Hasan case, 
the FBI focused on the occurrence (or previous non-occurrence) of a terrorist 
act, rather than the individual’s apparent intent to commit violence, and 
thereby neglected the counterterrorism process of inferring capability and 
intent.34 The prosecution might use the virtual connections with al-Awlaki 
to demonstrate intent to commit terrorism, but these probably will be con-
sidered secondary to the murder evidence. Thus, the commission of a clearly 
prosecutable crime is the basis of the Hasan case. His online interactions, 
however, provide evidence that he posed a security risk prior to the attack. 
Colleen LaRose
On February 1, 2011, Colleeen LaRose, a Pennsylvania woman, pleaded 
guilty to 34 accounts of material support to terrorism. Often dismissed for 
its amateurism and lack of operational security, the LaRose case has received 
less scrutiny than Hasan’s. Her case demonstrates that Islamist extremists are 
using the internet to identify and develop potential recruits in the United 
States. Furthermore, it increases our understanding of the internet’s role in 
the individual jihadist movement, from inciting an individual to go from 
aspirational to operational activities, to enabling a handler to vet prospec-
tive recruits online and evaluate with some assurance whether they will take 
action. Counterterrorism experts are using data from the case to establish 
different criteria for how online interactions pose a prosecutable security threat. 
A self-proclaimed fan of Anwar al-Awlaki, LaRose, using the pseudonym 
Jihad Jane, posted a YouTube video in June 2008 expressing her “desperate” 
desire to help suffering Muslims.35 This was sufficient information for 
Islamist extremists, trawling the internet for potential recruits, to initiate an 
online evaluation of her. For eleven months beginning in December 2008, 
LaRose communicated online with a variety of people who vetted her, sup-
ported her operationally, and ultimately directed her avowed commitment to 
jihad toward violent action. 
In December 2008, LaRose received a response to her June post from a male 
in South Asia (co-conspirator #1 according to court records) who engaged 
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her in an online conversation about their shared desire to wage jihad, and 
proposed that she consider becoming a shaheed, or Islamic martyr.36 In 
January 2009, a Western European resident (co-conspirator #2) emailed 
LaRose that he desired to become a martyr and although unsuccessful, he 
would continue to try. LaRose responded that she also desired martyrdom. 
In a February 2009 communication, LaRose confided to CC#1 that her 
physical appearance allowed her “to blend in with many people,” a factor 
that could help her online contact achieve his jihadi goal. The revelation 
about her physical appearance created sufficient interest to warrant ad-
ditional attention from her correspondents, and in March a third individual 
(co-conspirator #3) interjected himself into the conversation. He assumed 
the role of handling LaRose by developing an incremental process in which 
he would be responsible for evaluating the recruit’s commitment to acting, 
and for operationalizing an attack. Information revealed later in the indict-
ment indicates those initial communications between LaRose and the first 
two men were apparently random exchanges between “like-minded” indi-
viduals; CC#3, however, asks LaRose to tell him about CC#2, evidence of how 
terrorists seek to exploit social networks to identify other potential recruits. 
CC#3 initially established minimal bona fides for himself by telling LaRose 
that he was familiar with explosives. Concurrently, he suggested LaRose use 
the internet to “invite” another unidentified male fighter to join CC#3 for 
training in “the South Asian country.”37 He then reiterated that LaRose’s 
nationality allowed her freedom of movement, and asked LaRose to marry 
him so he could travel to Europe. LaRose agreed to marry him and made 
inquiries of the Swedish embassy about obtaining residency. At this point, 
CC#3 played a bit of a psychological game and allowed two weeks to pass 
after the marriage agreement before he contacted her again. This allowed her 
time to conduct the residency inquiries, but it is quite plausible that it also 
was a test of her reliability, to see whether she would go to the police or had 
a true psychological commitment to the cause. On March 22, 2009, CC#3 
directed LaRose to go to Sweden to kill the cartoonist Lars Vilks.38 LaRose 
agreed immediately. 
Upon accepting the mission, LaRose assumed an operational role as a 
fundraiser and global recruiter. She posted online solicitations for funds to 
support terrorism, and electronically distributed a carefully worded ques-
tionnaire that aimed to determine whether other Western women harbored 
an interest in jihad.39 Between December 2008 and March 2009, LaRose 
also had online discussions with Ali Damache, an Algerian man residing 
in Ireland who had expressed interest in martyrdom.40 Damache helped 
develop the questionnaire that LaRose distributed. In August 2009, LaRose 
started an online dialogue with Jamie Paulin-Ramirez, a Colorado woman, 
ultimately convincing her to travel Ireland to participate in jihad.41 When 
she reached Ireland with her young son, Paulin-Ramirez married Damache, 
a man she had never before met face-to-face. Simultaneously, LaRose 
gathered intelligence on Vilks, including joining his online community. She 
ultimately told her handler that it was “an honor and great pleasure to die 
or kill” for him.42 Nevertheless, there is no evidence that she ever travelled 
further than Ireland, where she was supposed to marry “co-conspirator #3.”43 
She was arrested upon her return, unmarried, from Ireland in October 2009.
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The Significance of the Online Jihadist
The effectiveness of online recruitment and the process of engagement in 
these two cases are chilling. LaRose’s public pronouncements made her easily 
identifiable as a potential shaheed recruit, but the potential usefulness of her 
physical appearance changed the dynamics. LaRose underwent a virtual vet-
ting process, in which she performed a series of tasks to prove her commit-
ment and willingness to act. As she completed each task, the handler became 
more confident in her. This process resembles a traditional face-to-face 
vetting process that focuses on psychological processes to determine com-
mitment and aid indoctrination.44 Furthermore, the process was completed 
relatively quickly. Within nine months from the initial contact, LaRose was 
travelling to Europe to execute the operation. 
The case of “Jihad Jane” portrays the individual jihadists as part of a virtual 
network of participants with global reach and global connections. LaRose 
was incited to jihadization through online engagements and without any 
face-to-face contact. It was her poor personal and operational security, 
particularly a number of provocative online comments, that apparently 
alerted a private group known as Youtube Smackdown to track her posts and 
eventually tip off the FBI.45 The public nature of her discussions permitted 
extensive internet tracking that adds to our understanding of the online 
world’s role in the individual jihad. According to Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Jennifer Arbittier Williams, the electronic evidence gathered from LaRose’s 
online interactions with co-conspirators would be sufficient to prove she 
traveled to Europe to locate Vilks, and that she attempted to raise funds 
for terrorists and recruit trainees in Europe and Asia.46 While conspiracy to 
kill in a foreign country and travelling to Ireland in support of violent jihad 
may have been the catalysts for authorities to arrest her, the majority of the 
34 “overt acts” noted in her indictment dealt with her online recruiting and 
fund solicitation activities.47 
The differences between Hasan and LaRose contribute to our understanding 
of the breadth of individual jihadi strategies and tactics. Both reflect the 
desire by jihadist groups to recruit Americans, and the importance of the 
internet in this process. While al-Awlaki’s message prompted LaRose to be-
come more vocal in her radicalization, the imam’s direct contact with Hasan 
inspired Hasan to self-directed action. Rather than relying on LaRose to take 
action on her own, her handler vetted her and provided specific direction 
towards supporting the jihad. Another lesson is found in the range of po-
tential goals of online recruitment and action. Judging from the post-attack 
statements regarding Hasan, the execution of the attack was the culmina-
tion of his service to the individual jihad. He was meant to be a shaheed, a 
foot-soldier in the struggle. LaRose’s recruitment of others who could travel 
in the West without detection, her solicitation of funds, and her broadening 
social network suggest her handler’s goal was to develop a virtual cell leader. 
LaRose’s lack of anonymity eroded her value to the jihadi network, but the 
lessons learned from her case will not be lost on her handler and others. 
Future recruitment and vetting can be expected to target less public indi-
viduals, who can assume the management roles of a network node facilitator, 
and perhaps cell leader, without creating as much digital exhaust. In sum, the 
online environment will continue to be a recruitment venue for the individual 
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jihad; recruitment objectives will vary; and through an online vetting process, 
various decisions will be made regarding the individual’s role in jihad.
These cases indicate how the online environment is evolving, and will 
continue to influence and accelerate the radicalization and jihadization 
processes. Virtual networks, the internet, and associated media allow infor-
mation to be shared quickly and permit active participation that enhances 
learning, cooperation, and innovation, thus enabling small groups and 
even individuals to accomplish big things. A recent White House meeting 
with local law enforcement identified three homegrown-terrorist warning 
signs: joining a group that advocates violence, receiving support from a 
network that plans violence, and seeking out a charismatic leader.48 Today, 
these connections may occur entirely in the virtual environment, reducing 
the isolation associated with the “lone wolf.”
Counter-strategies
Identifying and implementing effective counter-strategies against the indi-
vidual jihad is a complex problem that requires cooperation, patience, and 
perhaps some luck. Innovative thinking, using technology as an investigative 
tool, and combating networks with networks are the strategies advocated by 
FBI Director Robert Mueller.49 While the terrorists continue to exploit in-
ternet technologies to perform many tasks, the same technologies offer new 
avenues for law enforcement and intelligence services to track and identify 
terrorists. The virtual environment provides opportunities for collecting data, 
identifying linkages, tracking activities, and recognizing patterns. For ex-
ample, by analyzing Colleen LaRose’s online linkages, local law enforcement 
rolled up Ireland’s first known jihad cell and arrested a co-conspirator in 
Maryland in May 2012.50 Facebook and Twitter are repositories of voluntary 
information that may be collected and sorted to yield a searchable database 
from which less apparent linkages and warnings may be derived.51 Existing 
open-source tools in the hands of individuals with a modicum of Excel skills 
and situational awareness of an event can extract commonalities and pat-
terns from Twitter posts. Crowdsourcing, the evaluation of voluntary public 
information from groups, and participatory sensing, directed information 
collection or an informant 2.0 of sorts, also are valuable forensic methods. 
Increasingly, analytic techniques are making better sense from real-time 
online information and categorizing behavioral patterns through the analysis 
of digital exhaust. Still, it remains difficult to build a criminal case around 
intent derived from internet communications. 
The U.S. PATRIOT Act, passed in the wake of  9/11, expanded geographic 
authorization for FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) warrants, and 
the U.S. attorney general’s office has provided some legal guidelines for 
their use. Confronting the individual jihad requires a comprehensive coun-
terterrorism strategy that includes legal reforms, partnerships that facilitate 
intelligence gathering and sharing, community outreach, and education. 
Efforts at legal reforms that would criminalize the intent to do bad things 
through the analysis of online communications raise ethical and legal issues, 
and have had varying results. Mexico brought charges of terrorism against 
two individuals who used Twitter and Facebook to spread rumors about a 
school attack in Veracruz that resulted in real chaos.52 Although the state 
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prosecutors argued that the perpetrators’ virtual statements were equivalent 
to real ones, the case was dismissed. During riots in the United Kingdom 
in 2011, a number of people were arrested by British police and charged 
with inciting others to riot through Facebook and on Blackberries.53 In the 
aftermath of the riots, British Prime Minister David Cameron advocated a 
law that would allow the government to shut down internet access to people 
the government considered a threat. While the legal threshold of intent 
seemed to shift with the successful prosecution of some of those arrested, 
their convictions still required the prosecution to link physical actions to 
their online activities. These verdicts reflect a likely result in the Hasan case, 
in which his physical actions, not his online activities, will be the basis of 
conviction. 
The LaRose case, however, reflects a further evolution in the legal approach 
to online activity. The case against her was based in large part on 34 counts 
of providing material support to terrorists, primarily related to her online 
behavior.54 As previously cited, U.S. Attorney Williams charged that her 
online fundraising and recruiting for a terrorist organization were prosecut-
able actions under the “material support” statue, equal to her intent to attack 
Vilks.55 Her guilty plea, however, left it unclear whether a jury would have 
convicted her on all, or any, of those counts. 
The fact that the case was heard on the basis of the digital evidence seems 
to indicate that judges will have greater latitude in the United States to try 
terrorism cases based on online intent. The results of two other cases, one 
involving Tarek Mahanna, who was convicted of providing material support 
to terrorists include “translating and distributing” materials meant to inspire 
others to participate in jihad, and the other involving Jesse Curtis Morton, 
the leader of Revolution Muslim, convicted of using the internet to solicit 
murder and encourage violent extremism, also are evidence of a shifting 
paradigm.56 Along with the broadening of the definition of cyber-terrorism, 
these cases establish a firmer precedent for prosecution based on establishing 
intent by examining online statements and activities. These cases, as well as 
the LaRose case, also contribute to the debate surrounding First Amendment 
protection of freedom of speech, in light of an emerging perspective that 
words and information that promote terrorism are dangerous. Both France 
and the United Kingdom have criminalized “advocacy” and “glorification” 
of terrorism.57 In the United States, some have advocated lowering the 
threshold for prosecution by implementing a “clear and present danger” 
standard originally recommended in 1919.58 Another approach is to amend 
the “material support” statute to encompass advocacy as a punishable 
offense. While such approaches would offer new legal tools for combating 
the individual jihad, they pose serious constitutional questions, particularly 
regarding the First Amendment. For example, when is advocacy of an op-
posing point of view something other than part of a legitimate democratic 
process guaranteed by law? As Sahar Aziz noted, the First Amendment is 
owned by everyone and is not discriminatory.59 Echoing Aziz, First Amend-
ment supporters in the United Kingdom and United States warn that forays 
into this area risk starting down a slippery slope that could jeopardize civil 
rights, and embrace government censorship of the internet and eavesdrop-
ping on personal communications. 
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In its 2011 “National Strategy for Counterterrorism,” the White House 
stated, “The United States alone cannot eliminate every terrorist or terrorist 
organization … Therefore, we must join with key partners and allies to share 
the burdens of common security.”60 Inter-government, intra-government, 
and public-private partnerships are indispensible to countering terrorism, 
as both the Hasan and LaRose cases illustrate. Greater access to Hasan’s 
earlier communications with al-Awlaki might have allowed the FBI to better 
understand his virtual relationship with al-Awlaki and understand the threat 
he posed. LaRose’s extremist tendencies were initially recognized by a partici-
pant in the Middle East Performing Arts online forum. Having information 
and being able to effectively prosecute an individual based on that informa-
tion, however, are two different things. 
Conclusions
Eli Pariser warned, “A world constructed from the familiar is a world in 
which there’s nothing to learn.”61 The internet is globalizing local issues 
and expanding the multi-ethnic composition of groups and causes. The 
online jihadi echo chamber is creating a fertile ground for indoctrination 
into extreme ideologies and operationalization of extremist plots. The cases 
of Nidal Hasan and Colleen LaRose demonstrate that individuals radical-
ized via the internet in their personal space can be incited to violent action 
through the same medium. While Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano’s 
concern about the rising risk of “lone wolf” terrorism is well placed, it is also 
important to recall Sun Tzu’s famous admonishment, “Know your enemy 
and know yourself, and you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”62 
While not disregarding the “lone wolf” phenomenon, it also is important to 
recognize that a presumed “lone wolf” may actually be linked to recruiters, 
inspirationalists, and planners in a virtual environment—in essence, creating 
virtual terrorist cells.
When compared to the isolation of the solely self-directed person, individ-
uals who have maintained continuous internet interactions establish influ-
ential relationships, and can become willing to take violent action. While 
the effectiveness of online recruitment and indoctrination is understood, 
the debate continues over whether advocating extremism or participating 
in activities online constitute illicit actions. There is an emerging threshold, 
however, across which online interactions and activities are being considered 
a sufficient security risk to catalyze intervention. A basis from which to 
pursue legal prosecution of an individual based upon intent rather than 
strictly action is gradually emerging. The cases of Nidal Hasan and Colleen 
LaRose provide evidence of this changing paradigm.   
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Social media hold out the promise of discovering previously 
unidentified threats, as well as the peril of information overload. It is pos-
sible to utilize social media to find the unknown unknowns, those violent 
extremists who we can assume exist but whose identities are not currently 
known to us. It is also possible to triage social media profiles in order to 
identify those most likely to generate useful investigative leads. As a prac-
titioner of “artisanal intelligence,” I collect, analyze, and report for further 
investigation social media data related to a broad range of violent extremist 
threats—by hand, not with software. While the work requires a certain at-
tention to detail, the result is a high degree of familiarity with various threat 
groups. Most importantly, it is a method that works. 
Consider the Princess.1 She presents herself on a prominent social media 
site as being in her mid-20s, an ethnic Somali who was raised in Nairobi. 
She very clearly self-identifies with the Somali insurgent group al-Shabaab, 
describes her favorite music as “Anasheed,” and says her favorite movies are 
“Jihad Movies.”2 This information may be of passing interest but is hardly 
actionable. However, the Princess also identifies herself as a “Cashier/
Hostess” for an airline operating out of a country in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Even if it turns out the position only gives her access to an airport, and not 
to any of her employer’s aircraft, that is a good lead. 
The collection and analysis of social media profiles raises the specter of 
data mining, with its attendant controversy, methodological critiques, and 
negative public perceptions.3 In addition to the questionable efficacy and the 
political volatility of wholesale data mining, experience suggests that a more 
targeted approach to social media yields better results more quickly, with 
fewer false positives and less invasion of privacy. 
This more targeted approach is a variation on snowball sampling, a tech-
nique that has long proven useful in the study of deviant behavior in small 
populations.4 Start with individuals who can be found on social media, and 
who are known to be involved in the movement or organization of interest. 
For example, upon hearing that Samir Khan had left for Yemen (and his ulti-
mately fatal partnership with Anwar al-Awlaki and al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula),5 I began an analysis of the social networks of extremists who 
support al Qaeda in the United States by examining Samir Khan’s profile on 
a popular social media site. Figure 1 is the initial social network diagram that 
came out of this investigation.
Typology of Samir Khan’s Network
Samir Khan is the red node. Known U.S.-based associates of Khan are blue, 
and include people such as Proscovia Kampire Nzabanita (node 26), aka 
Umm Talha, wife of convicted Revolution Muslim activist Zachary Chesser, 
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aka Abu Talha al-Amriki. Ordinarily the people to the 
right, with only one connection to the network, would 
be dropped. Given that their one connection is to Samir 
Khan, however, I left them in. The remaining nodes, 
in green, are believed to be outside the United States. 
The members of Samir Khan’s network can be roughly 
divided by type, and this typology will characterize other 
networks of violent political actors, not only jihadist 
networks. Understanding these types can both help to 
understand the network and guide efforts to combat it.
Celebrities
In the case of Samir Khan’s network, the celebrity 
is Moazzam Begg (node 24), a former Guantanamo 
detainee and self-described human rights activist. Begg 
has many thousands of friends online, from a broad range of backgrounds 
and political perspectives. While these virtual friendships likely have little 
meaning for Begg, for Samir Khan and his friends to be able to reach out 
and connect to a public figure may have been important to them in the 
course of their radicalization.
Leaders
Leadership figures are in this case represented by Abdullah el-Faisal (node 11). 
Based in Jamaica, Sheikh Faisal has been imprisoned, detained, deported, and 
barred from flying or entering quite a few countries as a result of his frequent calls 
for violent jihad. Of note here is that while el-Faisal has almost as many connec-
tions to other network members as Moazzam Begg, el-Faisal’s online friends 
number a few hundred rather than many thousands, increasing the likeli-
hood that virtual friendship with Sheikh Faisal might be significant.
Mobilizing Structures
These are organizations, typically larger and less radical than the extremist 
groups that emerge from within them. For Samir Khan’s network, the 
mobilizing structure was a Salafist study group that operates both online and 
from a suburb of London. The group itself does not espouse violence, and 
yet Samir and a number of his friends could be found there. This is node 20.
Anomalies
Anomalies are individuals who associate with extremists while presenting a 
reassuringly peaceable face to the world. Here the anomalous individual is 
node 23. The reasons for this apparent disconnect between how someone 
presents themselves in public and who they associate with are many. One 
obvious scenario is that they feel a need to hide how they view events in the 
world, or what activities they may be involved in. 
While it is possible that a person happens to be friends with only like-
minded individuals, Samir Khan’s network, like all such networks I have 
examined, was composed of people linked to Khan for a variety of reasons. 
Some were clearly relatives, or people Khan went to high school with. There 
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was no need to collect any information about them. Often this type, the 
people of no interest to us, may be the largest part of the network. 
Information Triage
Social media profiles alone are unlikely to provide evidence of an imminent 
terrorist threat. We can assess profiles using an assortment of measures in 
order to focus further investigative work on a smaller pool of individuals 
more likely to be involved in extremist activity. The following is not a com-
plete list of the components of a social media profile, but it might be used to 
start a discussion of these elements and their assessment or measurement.
Connectedness
While a subject’s social network can be quantified, graphed, and analyzed, 
the analyst also needs to make a qualitative assessment of the subject’s 
associates. Success as a terrorist is a function of whom one associates with, 
and whom or what those associates know. Although violent extremists are 
often inclined to share their political opinions and concerns, experience 
says this is not always the case. Taimour al-Abdaly, for instance, launched 
a complex attack on Christmas shoppers in Stockholm, an attack that 
fortunately resulted only in his own death when his suicide vest exploded 
prematurely. Arid Uka opened fire on a U.S. military bus at the Frankfurt 
airport, killing two service members and wounding two others before being 
captured. Neither man displayed anything on their social media sites that 
would suggest they saw themselves as part of the global jihad, let alone that 
they were preparing to carry out an attack. Both were, however, openly 
associating with networks of known extremists: al-Abdaly with Samir Khan’s 
network and Uka with radical Salafist/jihadist activists in Germany—the 
very network that also included the Princess. There is no reason to think the 
Princess was previously known to any security service, nor might she have 
been suspected of links to a known network of violent extremists, yet human 
judgment and information triage identified her as a potential threat where 
data mining and its algorithms may have overlooked her. The presence or 
absence of visible support for violent extremism needs to be assessed in light 
of the quantity and quality of known associates.
Location
While in theory the internet enables globe-wide communications and the 
development of long-distance relationships, in practice the most gain is seen 
in local relationships.6 Existing social ties are strengthened more than new 
ties are formed, and real-world proximity appears to be a determining factor 
in the development of online ties. There are many reasons why people may 
be friends on the internet, but more often than not, the reason is that they 
already know each other. Online social networks tend to mirror real-world 
social networks.7 One consequence is that even when a subject declines to 
reveal his or her location, the location of friends can be used to discover 
where the subject is now, or was in the past. Conversely, if we are looking 
for unknown agents from a particular country who may be “sleepers” in our 
country, we could scour social media for any citizen of that country now 
living here. We could, for example, try to identify every Iranian-American 
and/or every Iranian national living in the United States who has a social 
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media account, and then examine each one in the hopes of finding those 
who self-identify with some element of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC). But there is a better way. A more targeted approach would 
start with individuals in Iran who are known to be involved with the IRGC, 
and work outwards searching for associates who are now in the United States.
Textual Analysis
Analysis of the text presented on a social media profile can at least place the 
subject somewhere on the ideological spectrum. The problem with focusing 
on what people say online is that, while it might provide some indication as 
to their intent, it is unlikely to shed light on their capabilities. In practice, 
people who become involved in terrorism may actually state their desire to 
be a terrorist; may say quite a lot without providing any clear expression of 
terrorist intent; or may say nothing at all.
Visual Analysis
Even when subjects self-censor the text they post to their profile, the 
political nature of extremists means they will often communicate through 
imagery what they might not verbalize. The Princess of jihad who worked 
for the airline made no explicit threats on her social media profile, but her 
profile picture was of a group of women who were members of al-Shabaab, 
holding AK-47 assault rifles and copies of the Qur’an in the air. In the case of 
someone linked to the IRGC, imagery associated with recent events may sup-
port an assessment that the connection is more, or other than, a reflection 
of a personal relationship. Many people may support the uprising of Shi’a 
Muslims in Bahrain, and some may support the Ba’athist regime of Bashar 
al-Assad of Syria. But someone who simultaneously supports protesters 
in Bahrain and the slaughter of protesters in Syria is reflecting the current 
political objectives of the most radical elements in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. The visual elements in this case will typically be the prominent display 
of images of Bahraini protesters being beaten or killed, side by side with 
Syrian flags and flattering images of Assad.
Link Analysis
The hyperlink is at the heart of the Web, and extremists can be counted 
upon to link to both what they like and what they hate. It is common, for 
example, that jihadists will list the forum they spend most of their time on as 
“their” website, even though they are not involved in the site’s management. 
In this regard, as in many others, violent extremists are not significantly 
different from the rest of us.
Focus on the Network
The objective of this analytical triage is to seek out both exculpatory and 
inculpatory information. It seeks to identify patterns and assess the degree 
to which these elements all point in a similar direction, and to identify 
anomalies or breaks in the pattern. It makes note of people who present as 
non-extremist, or who reveal little or nothing about themselves, but who are 
found to be associated with extremists all the same. It also notes those who, 
while linked in some way to known extremists, are not themselves a threat. 
As one pursues first the friends, and then the friends of friends, of people al-
ready involved in terrorism, this triage technique helps maintain the focus of 
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the investigation. The end result is a network of weakly tied but like-minded 
people. Given that this network was mapped out based on the social media 
profiles of bona fide terrorists, it is likely that from within it individuals and 
strongly-tied groups will emerge and try to involve themselves in terrorism.
While we can identify the components of such networks, and map out their 
interrelationships and locations, there are too many other factors involved 
for us to be able to predict who the next terrorist will be. Unable to know 
exactly who will emerge from the network and strike, we therefore need to 
undermine the network of extremists as a whole. The strength of weak ties 
is in their ability to move information from ideology to actionable intel-
ligence.8 The weakness of weak ties lies in their vulnerability to infiltration. 
A strongly tied group may constitute an operational unit, but in becoming 
so it invariably breaks the weak ties to the community it emerged from. 
Successful counterterrorism exacerbates this process, causing the network 
itself to wither.
An artisanal approach to social media analysis bypasses the various problems 
inherent in a big-data approach, and bears fruit more rapidly by developing 
a context in which to assess an individual as a potential target for investiga-
tion or recruitment. It also places individuals in a network that may be 
observed for evidence of impending violence; infiltrated and exploited; or 
undermined and dismantled.  
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Another Tool in the Influencer’s Toolbox: A Case Study
LTC Jamie Efaw and  
SFC Christopher Heidger
Much of the recent writing within military circles surround-
ing social media has centered on what can be learned from “bad guys’” use 
of social media sites, or the role social media played (and play) in events such 
as the Arab Spring and Haiti disaster relief. However, from an information 
operations perspective, the “golden ticket” in our operations is the ability to 
influence behavior and attitudes. The questions we address in this article are: 
“Can an information operator use social media to influence audiences, and 
if so, how?” Attitudes and behaviors cannot be changed overnight; doing so 
requires exposure to a persuasive message repeatedly over an extended period 
of time—a task social networking tools are perfectly designed to accomplish. 
One should not, however, view social media as the single best way to exert 
influence, but rather, see online networking as another tool in the com-
municator’s toolbox that enhances larger influence campaigns. In this paper, 
we will share some of our experiences from putting theory into practice, our 
phased approach, some lessons learned, and recommendations for getting 
started in your own organization. 
Getting Started and Building the Target Audience
In the winter of 2008, I (Jamie Efaw) published a paper in IO Sphere titled 
“Social Networking Services: The New Influence Frontier.”1 I had been 
thinking about these ideas for quite a while, and at the time, the paper was 
largely theoretical, focused on the “whys” and “hows” of social networking 
platforms and their application toward counterterrorism efforts. In 2009, 
my new NCOIC (non-commissioned officer in charge) and co-author Chris 
Heidger and I arrived at the United States European Command (EUCOM) in 
Stuttgart, Germany at the same time. We found we had inherited an eight-
year old regional Web news and information initiative called the Southeast 
European Times or SETimes, which had an accompanying eight-month 
old Facebook companion presence.2 We both saw this situation as a perfect 
opportunity to leverage social media and apply the theoretical framework 
I’d developed in my paper to a real-world situation. As a starting point, we 
identified four goals for having a social media presence:
1. Take advantage of the existing social media community to introduce 
and draw them to SETimes.com.
2. Provide an additional forum that exposes our target audience to our 
themes and messages.
3. Provide a convenient place for the SETimes community to discuss 
regional topics of interest and interact in an environment where they 
are comfortable and familiar.
4. Establish a communication platform we could use during a crisis, 
humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief operation. 
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In an effort to minimize the risk of our enterprise failing to catch hold 
or committing a public relations foul, while simultaneously maximizing 
learning and flexibility, our social media expansion efforts took a very 
deliberate five-phase approach, which is laid out in detail below: 
Phase 0: Establish a Facebook Presence 
Phase I: Research and Improvement 
Phase II: Focused Advertising 
Phase III: Increased User Interaction 
Phase IV: Shift Focus onto Established Social Networks 
Figure 1 summarizes the 
SETimes’ Facebook fan 
growth by phase from 
March 2010–January 
2011. 
Phase 0: Establish a Facebook Presence (March 2009– 
February 2010)
Phase 0 started prior to our arrival at  EUCOM, and consisted of creating a 
Facebook page for SETimes, adding a RSS feed from the webpage to the Face-
book page, and putting a Facebook link at the top of the SETimes homepage. 
During our first six months on the job we made no changes; noting that 
readership (“fans”) and interaction (fans “liking” a post or making a com-
ment) on the Facebook page did not increase over that time, however, we 
realized that in preparation for Phase 1 we needed to benchmark the current 
initiative. We do not see ourselves as competitors with the Department of 
State (DoS), but we used official DoS Facebook pages to serve as a yardstick 
for our site, since they have a comparable presence around the globe. A year 
after its creation, the SETimes’ 
Facebook page gained an average 
of less than one fan per day, for 
a total of 306, and ranked in the 
bottom 15% when compared to 
similar DoS pages. Our audience 
was largely U.S.-based, and there 
were more English-speaking fans 
than all other languages combined 
(see Figure 2). 
Phase 1: Research and Improvement (March–June 2010)
In March of 2010, we began our research and improvement phase, which 
started with the question: “What is the dominant social media platform in 
Southeast Europe?” A good surface-level tool for this research is Alexa.com, 
Figure 1. Fans by Phase
Figure 2. Phase 0 Results
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which identifies the most popular sites in a targeted region. With Facebook 
rated as the frontrunner (which will not always be the case), we then evalu-
ated successful Facebook presences similar to SETimes, such as U.S. govern-
ment pages and those of other regional news organizations, to get an idea of 
what they were doing right. 
Based on our findings, we took a few minor steps to improve our Facebook 
page. First, we opted to manually post content in lieu of RSS feeds, which 
for a social platform we decided were too impersonal, mechanical, and 
annoying. Second, we added new features such as photo albums and a 
discussion tab with conversation topics, in an effort to promote a social 
atmosphere that was more in line with Facebook’s interactive environment. 
Third, we published a story on SETimes.com about Facebook in South-
east Europe, which also encouraged readers to join our Facebook page (see 
Figure 3).3 
Lastly, in May 2010, we provided basic Facebook instruction at our annual 
SETimes writers’ conference, and encouraged our contributors to become 
“fans” and interact on our page. 
Despite focusing on Southeast European audiences, Figure 4 shows that 
we still had a very large U.S.-based audience and an even larger ratio 
of English-speaking fans than we had at the end of phase 0. While we 
understood that we still had a long way to go, we were encouraged that our 
new fans per day had doubled, indicating an increase in the page’s appeal. 
Phase II: Focused Advertising (July–October 2010)
Phase II, which started in July 2010, is where our project started gaining 
significant momentum. The first noteworthy change was the introduction 
of advertising to Facebook users in SETimes’ twelve core countries (see 
Figure 5). 
We chose a rate of $5/day, which made Facebook advertising a cost-effective 
as well as user-friendly tool. Getting started requires only a credit card, some 
small thumbnail images, an introductory sentence, and an intended audi-
ence. Once established, advertising costs are set through a daily geographi-
cally-dependent bidding process that ranges from less than U.S. 10 cents to 
more than $1.00 per ad click.
Demographic data are the greatest advantage that Facebook provides a 
planner. These data include age, sex, country, city, marital status, education 
level, and even interests, all of which are gathered as users establish and 
update their profiles. These are the data that focus advertising and provide 
excellent, real-time, demographically separated measures of performance. 
Although we have used Facebook ads only to increase the number of fans on 
our Facebook page, these ads can satisfy other objectives such as advertising 
an event, directing people to a website, or simply getting a target audience to 
download an application. 
Figure 3. SETimes Article about 
Facebook in Southeast Europe
Figure 4. Phase I Results
Figure 5. Facebook Advertisement
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While advertising was an important step, we also added some additional 
features to enhance the users’ overall experience during this phase. First, we 
added the “Like” button to individual articles on SETimes (Figure 6). 
When SETimes readers who are also Facebook users click that they “like” 
something, the action is indicated on their Facebook pages, and shows up 
on their friends’ pages, along with a link to the “liked” content. Second, we 
added prompts to our Facebook posts in order to encourage interaction. 
Typically, we would link to a recently published SETimes article and then 
post a related question or comment. For example, we posted an article 
about the start of the Croatian 
president’s second year in 
office, along with the following 
question: “Josipovic started 
his 2nd year as President of 
Croatia. How do you think he 
did in his 1st year? Share your 
thoughts.”
Throughout Phase II we saw a sharp increase in the growth of fans from our 
target region (see Figure 7). Due to focused advertising, we now gained a 
daily average of 35 new fans, 99% of whom were from our target audience. 
As also depicted in Figure 7, U.S. readers dropped off the readership chart, 
and English language usage as a proportion diminished. 
After four months of posting content to our page once every five days, we 
realized that Facebook users tended to visit pages other than their own only 
on the day new content appeared on their wall. The “if you build it, they will 
come” model, in other words, does not apply in social media. In the world 
of “new media,” consumers no longer actively seek out or pull information; 
instead, they subscribe to topics of interests and have the information fed to 
them. In Phase III we adjusted our approach to fit this model. 
Phase III: Increased User Interaction (November–December 2010)
Phase III began in November 2010. The goals in this phase were to imple-
ment lessons learned from Phases I and II, increase fan interaction, and test 
some of the more specific advertising techniques. 
Observations from previous phases revealed that the timing of Facebook 
posts affected interaction levels. For two weeks we logged hourly Facebook 
traffic from 0600–2300. This showed us that peak traffic for our target audi-
ence occurred between 0900–1000 and 1700–1830. Based on these findings, 
we began posting to Facebook twice a day, during each of these periods. We 
reasoned that this technique would optimize views and reader interaction 
while minimizing the risk of becoming a nuisance. To further encourage 
interaction, we started producing exclusive content for our Facebook page 
such as video essays, and we introduced a weekly “hook,” such as a survey 
question, a “complete the sentence” statement, a “fan of the month” post, or 
a quote of the week. 
Figure 6. Facebook Like Button 
on SETimes Article
Figure 7. Phase II Results
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Lighter interactive posts were 
essential to keep the page in 
line with the social nature of 
Facebook.
Other early engagement efforts taught us several useful lessons. First, heavier 
content, such as the re-posting of a SETimes feature article, performed better 
in the morning, while lighter posts received better traction in the evening. 
These lighter interactive evening posts (often devoid of core themes and 
messages) were essential to keep the page in line with the social nature of 
Facebook. Finally, we found that simple encouragement such as, “Thanks for 
your comment, we value your insight,” or “Interesting photo, can you tell us 
more about it?” proved invaluable as a method to keep fans engaged and let 
them know we were paying attention to them. 
From our advertising campaign, we observed another interesting trend. 
During Phases I and II, audiences from our lower-priority countries (based 
on existing national and command guidance) quickly used the majority of 
our daily advertising budget by clicking on our ads more frequently than 
higher priority-country audiences. To rectify this, we divided our increased 
advertising budget of $10/day in accordance with SETimes’ established three-
tier priority system. Tier 1 (highest priority) audiences received $5/day, while 
Tier 2 audiences received $3/day, and Tier 3 received only $2/day.
Lastly, due to the steadily increasing number of fans and interaction, we 
anticipated a need for a Facebook Terms of Service statement that would 
provide general information about SETimes, and codify acceptable and 
unacceptable member conduct.4 Our Terms of Service proved useful later 
when dealing with inappropriate reader comments.
Until this phase,  EUCOM command policy was to block all social media 
sites, so all these Facebook activities had to be managed from non-govern-
ment computers. After months of dialogue with communicators across 
the staff, Admiral James Stavridis, the EUCOM commander, published a 
comprehensive social media policy granting command access to social media 
sites. In addition to making our Facebook campaign far more convenient 
to maintain, workplace access enabled us to determine peak traffic times, 
increase posting frequency, and continuously monitor our Facebook page—
maximizing the efficiency of a real-time communication platform.
During Phase III, English-language users continued to drop off, while fans 
who used SETimes target-country languages continued to increase at a rapid 
pace (see Figure 8). While our advertising doubled, there was, surprisingly, 
an increase of only four more fans per day compared to our daily average in 
Phase II—a trend that has not changed. In fact, the return on investment 
dropped off very rapidly as daily advertising levels increased. For example, if 
a Facebook page gets twenty new fans per day for $10, it does not necessarily 
mean that investing $50 per day will bring in one hundred fans. 
Phase IV: Shift Focus to Established Social Networks (January 
2011–ongoing)
At the beginning of 2011, we initiated Phase IV, which involved increasing 
the advertising budget to $100/day and focusing our efforts on increasing 
four measurable Facebook page user actions: 1) page visits; 2) page “likes”; 3) 
fan interaction; and 4) referrals to SETimes.com (i.e., reads of SETimes.com 
The return on investment 
dropped off very rapidly as 
daily advertising increased.
Figure 8. Phase III Results
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We recognized the need to 
leverage the power of social 
comparison that is inherent in 
the Facebook platform.
content). In order to promote an increase in the above actions, we recog-
nized the need to leverage the power of social comparison that is inherent 
in the Facebook platform. Social Comparison Theory postulates that people 
evaluate their opinions and actions based on their peer group. When one’s 
own opinions or beliefs are in contradiction to the comparison group, there 
is a tendency to either change one’s own opinions or attempt to convince 
others that your beliefs are correct in order to re-establish group cohesion. 
Typically, when encountering content on a traditional website, the reader 
does not know what other friends have read the same article, who liked it, 
or what they thought about the content they read. Social media platforms, 
however, are by definition built on social connections, and thus are for-
matted to allow the reader or fan to engage in social comparison.5 
In previous phases, we advertised to all Facebook users within SETimes’ 
established target audience (over 30 million Facebook users, and growing). 
This all-encompassing approach established nodes in existing social networks 
in every corner of our focus countries; however, the majority of our fans were 
not connected in any meaningful way. To rectify this, we expanded established 
nodes (existing SETimes Facebook fans) and began advertising only to their 
Facebook “friends.” Currently, a tag at the bottom of every SETimes Face-
book ad might say something like, “Joe Smith likes this.” As more “friends” 
within a circle “liked” the ad, it might say “Joe Smith and 5 of your friends 
like this”—increasing the power of social comparison with every new fan. 
These newly formed pockets of 
SETimes fans not only increased 
the effectiveness of our advertising, 
but also increased the potential of 
both online and offline conversa-
tions with friends surrounding the 
content of the Facebook posts. 
Figure 9 illustrates that previously 
observed trends continued, with a 
marked increase in the growth of 
fans from the target audience. 
Once a social media user joins the site or page, social comparison continues 
to have an influence. When readers interact with content on Facebook, they 
immediately know how many other total users have “liked” the content, but 
more importantly, they know how many and which of their own friends 
(their comparison group) “liked” it (they do not see which of their friends 
do not like an article). Additionally, they can see any comments made about 
the content and make comments of their own in real-time. Whether the 
reader tries to change the opinion of friends or changes his or her own to 
match theirs, either outcome could be useful for the influencer if properly 
managed.
Lessons Learned and Difficulties 
Over the last eighteen months we have identified several advantages, dif-
ficulties, and lessons learned while using Facebook, many of which already 
A tag might say,  “Joe Smith 
and 5 of your friends like 
this.”
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Where are the conversations 
among your target population 
taking place?
have been discussed above. The following section offers nine broad topics we 
consider principles for getting started.
1. Research and listen.
Where are the conversations among your target population taking place? On 
what platforms? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the different 
social media platforms for reaching your audience? Answer these basic ques-
tions before launching a social media effort.
2. Have a plan, but experiment. Be deliberate, expect failures, and 
be flexible.
Before starting, have a plan and be deliberate in your method, but also leave 
room to experiment. The same principles that worked for us will not neces-
sarily work for everyone. As you experiment, start small, expect failures, and 
be prepared to make adjustments. This will ensure you have the flexibility to 
make required changes while minimizing the negative effects of failures and 
growing pains. 
3. Provide fans with experiences. Make interaction easy. But do not 
saturate!
We found that to get fans involved with our content, we needed to provide 
online “experiences” that invited them to interact. An activity that encour-
ages engagement, participation, and conversation, yet remains easy and 
quick for the reader, is ideal. In the social media world, more is not always 
better. A user typically is not going to join in an in-depth erudite dialogue, 
but most will likely vote in a poll, complete a sentence, or “like” a quote. 
Too much information (i.e., too many posts) hinders your effort. At best you 
run the risk of being ignored, and at worst, annoying the individuals you 
want to influence.
4. Benchmark your efforts and progress.
Benchmarks help you see progress toward your goal. If you do not establish 
a reliable baseline from the outset of your activity, it is impossible to show 
how far you’ve come at subsequent benchmarks, or at the end of your effort. 
In March of 2010, SETimes’ Facebook page had 306 fans and was ranked in 
the bottom 15% when compared to similar DoS Facebook pages. Less than a 
year later, we had over 17,300 fans and it was ranked in the top 6% compared 
to similar pages. Other aspects can be benchmarked as well. Our Phase IV 
measurable actions provide a good starting point: 1) page visits; 2) page 
“likes;” 3) fan interaction; and 4) referrals to an external website (i.e., reads). 
5.  Add a Terms of Service policy. 
A Terms of Service policy outlines acceptable and unacceptable user behavior 
on the site. By stating policies upfront, you have de facto authority to delete 
inappropriate posts and ban disruptive users from the site. On several occa-
sions, this policy enabled our fans to regulate each other and make sure that 
To get fans involved with 
our content, we needed to 
provide online “experiences.”
This was a welcome 
indication that our page’s fans 
were taking “ownership.”
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Find senior leaders in your 
organization who “get it” and 
who will act as advocates.
fellow fans abided by the spirit and the letter of the policy. This was also a 
welcome indication to us that our page’s fans were taking “ownership” of the 
page and regarded it as theirs to monitor. 
6. Educate the organization.
Much can be written about educating your organization. Be aware that some 
individuals will never understand, or desire to understand, what you’re doing 
and how you’re doing it. However, there are others who are willing to learn. 
Help these people set up an account and show them how social media work, 
then encourage them to experiment from their personal computers. Ensure 
you are an available resource to answer questions, but be careful to do it 
without making anyone feel stupid. Locate and mobilize key personnel in 
your organization. If possible, find senior leaders in your organization who 
“get it” and who will act as advocates when needed. Similar to the “start small 
and expect failures” discussion above, do not make unreasonable or unreal-
istic promises to your bosses. We kept our developmental phases pretty quiet 
until we were able to demonstrate some solid metrics. Furthermore, because 
we started small, there was no need or requirement to report setbacks. 
7. Real-time interactions.
Real-time interactions are both Facebook’s greatest advantage and its greatest 
challenge. The challenge lies in the fact that these interactions require con-
stant monitoring in order to respond appropriately. Social media encourage 
conversation, which assumes timely responses. Failure in this area alienates 
fans and discourages future participation. A unique advantage of real-time 
interaction on Facebook, however, is that every time a fan comments on a 
discussion thread, the comment is sent out to everyone who has previously 
taken part in that thread, as well as all of the friends of the commenters. This 
feature continues to draw people back into the dialogue. 
8. Translation and the use of an official language.
It is important to be aware that social media tools are ideally suited for cam-
paigns focused on a single audience with a common language and problem 
set. Our audience, in contrast, spans twelve countries and ten spoken 
languages. Regardless of language(s) used, there are two translation manage-
ment issues: 1) fan comments submitted in a language other than the page’s 
official language(s); and 2) the general difficulty of maintaining oversight 
on a second-language (for the manager) fan page. For the first issue, on-call 
translators are required; this, however, can take time. While waiting for full 
translation, we have found the Google Translate and Live Translate applica-
tions to be useful for an immediate base-line understanding. To maintain 
oversight of a second-language Facebook page requires a minimum of one 
full-time, native speaking-level employee. 
9. Leadership’s lack of understanding.
There are many people who view Facebook as an invasive site that reveals 
far too much information about its users. Although mistrust was a more 
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Social media tools are ideally 
suited for a single audience 
with a common language and 
problem set.
common problem three to four years ago, it still is an identifiable genera-
tional issue and a recognizable hindrance to social media initiatives within an 
organization.6 While many senior-level leaders still do not fully understand 
social media, most at least understand its importance. Basic understanding 
and acceptance is all one needs to move forward. 
Summary and Conclusion
When we look back at the original four goals we set for getting involved in 
Facebook, we are gratified to see that we achieved each of them.
Leverage the existing social media community to introduce and 
draw them to SETimes.com.
By the middle of 2012, we will have accumulated nearly 400,000 SETimes 
Facebook fans. Nearly all of these members of our target audience are 
individuals who had never heard of SETimes.com, nor been exposed to the 
website’s themes and messages prior to the launch of our Facebook page. 
Additionally, in 2011, we recorded over 120,000 visits to SETimes.com from 
readers who came directly from our Facebook page; in other words, they 
were on the SETimes’ Facebook page, clicked on a hyperlinked headline that 
interested them, and then read the full article on SETimes.com.
Provide an additional forum that exposes our target audience to 
our themes and messages.
If a fan never clicked on one of the Facebook-posted links taking them to the 
SETimes.com content, they would still be exposed, three times a day, seven 
days a week, to its themes and messages via postings and interactive features 
on the SETimes’ Facebook wall. 
Provide a convenient place for the SETimes community 
to discuss regional topics of interest, and interact in an 
environment where they are comfortable and familiar.
We assessed our achievement of this goal by asking our fans, in 
a Facebook poll on January 23, 2012, what they liked most about 
the SETimes’ Facebook page. The great majority (72%; 1720 of 
2390) of respondents acknowledged that the feature they appreci-
ated most was that the page provided “a forum for an exchange of 
opinions and dialogues with others in the region” (see Figure 10). 
Establish a trusted communication platform that can 
be leveraged during a crisis, humanitarian assistance, or 
disaster relief operation. 
This function was validated on several different occasions. A good ex-
ample occurred in September 2011 during a flare-up of tensions at the 
By the middle of 2012, we will 
have nearly 400,000 SETimes 
Facebook fans.
Figure 10. Poll Question: What 
do you like about SETimes? 
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Appropriately designed 
content prompts the target 
audience to share the 
message with others.
Serbia-Kosovo border. Utilizing the SETimes’ Facebook page, we were able, 
first, to inform the target audience of the actual situation on the ground, 
thereby discrediting rumors and disinformation. As a result of this effort, 
combined with our Google advertising, SETimes’ coverage of the event was 
the #1 overall search result in Google news. Second, by utilizing the Face-
book polling option, we were able to quickly gauge sentiment among the 
target audience, and provide that information to commanders and decision-
makers. The fact that our audience trusted the integrity of our information 
was key to our success on these occasions.
The question posed in the first paragraph of this article, you may 
recall, was: “Can an information operator use social media to exert 
influence and if so, how?” After two and a half years of daily experi-
ence with the SETimes platform, it is evident to us that Facebook 
and other social media sites are valid influence tools. First, social 
media allow an influencer to expose the target audience multiple 
times to the crafted content. As one can observe in Figure 11, over 
one million Facebook users were exposed to (had read or viewed) 
SETimes Facebook content more than five times in a seven-day 
period. 
One reason this statistic is encouraging is that users not only saw SETimes 
content several times, but they chose to have our content delivered to them 
or they actively sought it out. 
Second, we discovered 
that appropriately de-
signed content prompts 
the target audience to 
share the message with 
others. Participation in 
a dialogue or a conver-
sation about a topic 
encourages an individual 
to think deeply about the 
topic. To see how often 
this was occurring, in December 2011, we asked the poll question: “How 
often have you had a discussion with someone about a topic/issue you read 
about on SETimes?” (see Figure 12). Eighty-nine percent (2099/2365) of 
respondents acknowledged that they had had conversations about SETimes’ 
content either daily or weekly. 
These results confirmed that our target audience is thoughtfully considering 
the material presented by SETimes. The results also indicate that the online 
target audience is expanding the reach of the SETimes’ message by having 
conversations with their off-line, real-world social network, thus expanding 
SETimes’ sphere of influence.
Lastly, while we have illustrated that well-designed social media offer the 
tools to deliver a message and encourage dialogue, measuring influence 
(effectiveness) still remains difficult. Besides observing a change in the 
behavior of members, self-reporting (polling) is often the only method for 
Figure 11. Total Views x Frequencies 
of Views from 1–7 January 2012
An impressive 93 percent 
of fans who responded 
acknowledged they had been 
affected by our product.
Figure 12. Sharing with Others Poll Question
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determining effectiveness. To this end, we asked our Facebook 
fans: “Has anything you have read on SETimes.com caused you 
to think differently about an issue?” (see Figure 13). Although 
people are often reluctant to admit they have been influenced, an 
impressive 93 percent (2693/2916) of SETimes’ Facebook fans who 
responded acknowledged they had been affected by our product. 
As one can gather from our experiences, social media initiatives 
require constant attention; the good news is that they require 
only limited personnel and funding to have an impact. No 
matter how enticing this high return on investment may sound, 
however, it is essential to keep in mind that Facebook, or any social media 
platform, is not a stand-alone tool. In fact, it will always work best in con-
cert with traditional communication tools supporting a larger effort, event, 
or cause, such as, in our case, the SETimes news and information website. 
Used properly, this rapidly evolving capability is proving itself a tremendous 
addition to the communication toolbox. 
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In this article we draw on social movement theory to help 
explain how the use of social media, in particular Twitter feeds, may have 
played a role in the emergence of the Egyptian Arab Spring revolution. 
More precisely, we suggest that activists’ uses of Twitter may have facilitated 
the framing of grievances in ways that resonated with their target audience. 
In an examination of a subgroup of primarily Arab-speaking Twitter users, 
we found that not only did traditional media and activists appear to play a 
large role in framing the events in Egypt, but so did a fake Twitter account 
impersonating Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. This account’s tweets 
attracted a large audience, and may have helped disseminate a portrayal of 
Mubarak as a corrupt leader who should resign, both of which were goals of 
the Egyptian revolution.
People often assume that all that is needed for a social movement, an insur-
gency, or other form of collective action to emerge is for enough individuals 
to become sufficiently angry about a particular social condition. While 
grievances are certainly necessary for sustained collective action, they alone 
are not enough. As social movement scholars have noted, in most societies 
there are plenty of individuals who are angry with the status quo, but few 
become activists or engage in contentious politics.1 For a social movement 
or insurgency to gain traction, other factors need to fall into place.2 In par-
ticular, not only do individuals need to harbor grievances of some kind, but: 
1) the grievances have to be framed in such a way that people recognize they 
share them with others, and believe that together they can do something 
about them (i.e., insurgent consciousness); 2) the aggrieved population needs 
to have access to and be able to appropriate sufficient resources so they do 
not have to rely on external support (i.e., sufficient mobilizing resources); and 
3) they need to perceive (whether correctly or incorrectly) that the broader 
socio-political environment is either vulnerable to collective action, or that 
it represents a significant threat to the group’s interests or survival (i.e., 
expanding opportunities or increased threats). In isolation, none of these fac-
tors is sufficient to generate and sustain an insurgency. When they converge 
and interact, however, collective action becomes a possibility although, we 
should emphasize, not a certainty. 
In this paper we explore how the use of social media, in particular Twitter 
feeds, may have played a key role during the Egyptian Arab Spring of 2011. 
We focus on Twitter’s role in the framing of grievances, but along the way 
we also note how it may have been used to attack some of the Egyptian 
government’s vulnerabilities and as a communication network among 
activists. We begin with an overview of social movement theory, and explain 
the process of framing.3 We next consider how Twitter functions, and how 
activists and others used it during the Egyptian Arab Spring. We then 
examine Twitter data gleaned from the Arab Spring and what it possibly tells 
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us about its role in the framing process. We conclude with a few thoughts on 
the role that social media could play in facilitating the development of social 
movements, insurgencies, and other forms of collective action.
Social Movement Theory
The question of why populations that had appeared quiescent will sud-
denly rise up against their leaders in protest, riot, and full-blown revolt has 
intrigued and confounded rulers and researchers alike since long before Nic-
colò Machiavelli wrote his treatises on benevolent tyranny in the early 16th 
century. Social movement theory suggests three interrelated causes, each of 
which is insufficient by itself, but which in combination can fan smoldering 
resentment into mass revolt: a perceived threat and the opportunity to act, 
access to resources, and a unifying message. As this section notes, access to 
new social media may be helping bring these three factors together more 
quickly and efficiently than ever.
Opportunity and Threat
Disaffected populations generally face numerous obstacles in attempting to 
mobilize, while opportunities to overcome those obstacles are rare and tend 
to fluctuate over time. Doug McAdam has suggested that the socio-political 
environment becomes vulnerable to collective action in three different and 
interrelated ways: 1) political instability; 2) an enhanced political position for 
the aggrieved population; and 3) ideological openness.4 Political instability 
occurs when elite control of the political status quo is weakened by events 
such as economic crises, armed conflict, large-scale natural disaster, and so 
on. An increase in the political position (i.e., power) of aggrieved popula-
tions can result from broad social changes that occur over extended periods. 
Finally, social change can lead the wider population to tolerate alternative and 
sometimes even subversive ideas championed by the aggrieved population.5
More recently, scholars have noted that expanding political opportunities 
are more likely to be a factor in democratic societies, while in autocratic 
societies it is often substantial threats to a group’s interests or survival that 
matter.6 Drawing on Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s observation 
that individuals are especially adverse to loss,7 many scholars argue that 
groups will risk far more to preserve what they have than on what they 
might gain.8
Whether it is the expansion of opportunities or an increase in threats, nei-
ther will lead to collective action unless groups perceive them as such.9 An 
established political order can be reeling, but if no group notices this, it is 
unlikely that any will take advantage of the situation to bring about change. 
Similarly, if a group does not recognize that its interests or its very existence 
are threatened, then it may not act in time to avert its own destruction.
Mobilizing Resources
Favorable and/or threatening changes in the political environment only 
increase the probability that nascent insurgencies will mobilize. Whether 
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they actually do also depends on whether they have access to and are able 
to appropriate the resources necessary to mobilize and sustain their cause.10 
Another enabling factor is access to a network of pre-existing organizations 
(formal and informal) that can provide the institutional foundation on 
which to build a movement. These also help link people to activists, form 
and sustain the moral outrage that feeds insurgencies, and facilitate mobi-
lization and deployment for insurgent activities.11 Along with fostering a 
sense of solidarity, networks can also contribute other key resources, such as 
the ability to monitor participants (the latter is especially important when 
defection poses serious security issues to insurgencies), leaders, and com-
munications.12 One other resource that incipient movements often need is 
“free spaces” (e.g., coffee houses, religious institutions, neighborhood bars, 
ungoverned spaces) that are beyond the surveillance and control of authori-
ties, and where groups can frame the narratives (e.g., “We shall overcome.”) 
that accompany successful mobilization efforts.13
Insurgent Consciousness
As noted at the outset, discontent by itself does not produce social move-
ments and insurgencies; there needs to be what Christian Smith calls “the 
development of an insurgent consciousness,” which occurs when the social 
situation is framed in such a way that people feel compelled to mobilize.14 
A budding social movement, however, cannot expect that all potential 
members will be able to grasp fully the group’s ideology. Thus, movement 
elites generally frame their group’s core message in generalized ideological 
snippets, much like bumper stickers,15 that are easily communicated to their 
target audience.16 Given the 140-character limitation of Twitter messages 
(see discussion below), Twitter appears to be an ideal tool for broadcasting 
ideological snippets and framing grievances for delivery to a social move-
ment’s target audience.
Twitter and the Arab Spring
Twitter is a micro-blogging tool that enables users to send and receive 
text-based, publicly available posts of up to 140 characters known as “tweets,” 
which can contain messages, images, and links to internet sites. In addition 
to broadcasting tweets to others, users can choose to follow other users, so 
that they are constantly updated with new information when those they 
follow “tweet.” They can also describe the topic of their tweet by placing a 
“#” before a word. If they want to pass on another person’s message, they 
can “retweet” that message to their own followers or other users. Retweets 
contain the original message along with the original tweeter’s name, but they 
can be passed on to other users with additional content if the retweeting user 
so desires. 
During the 2011 Egyptian protests, many users posted messages, images, and 
links to other web pages about what was occurring through Twitter. These 
helped to create a global conversation about events in Egypt. Some struck 
a chord and were retweeted thousands of times, while others did not reach 
large audiences.
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In order to understand which users were significant conduits of information 
during this time, we analyzed over one million tweets about Egypt from two 
days, January 28 and February 4, 2011, that we downloaded using a research 
tool on the Twitter API (Application Programming Interface).17 The Twitter 
API offers various tools that allow other programs to receive data from and 
send data to Twitter. We used a program to request from Twitter all publicly 
available data it could find in regards to users tweeting about Egypt; the 
program then organized and stored that data. The key aspects of the data 
that were stored included the user’s Twitter name, the content of each tweet, 
and a description of each user (from the user’s public profile). Using these 
data, we generated a user-by-user network where a direct tie was drawn 
between two users if one of the users sent a message to the other, or a user 
retweeted the message of another. In the case of the latter, we drew a tie from 
the author of the original message to the user who “retweeted” the message. 
In the end, our user-by-user network included 196,670 users with 526,976 
ties between them. Figure 1 presents a visualization of the network.
The size of the network we traced makes the application of some standard 
social network-analysis algorithms difficult to implement (because many 
are computer intensive) and the results of others potentially open to misin-
terpretation. For example, in terms of degree centrality, which is a count of 
each user’s ties, the celebrity singer Katy Perry ranks in the top ten in our 
database. While it is possible that Perry’s tweets helped frame the grievances 
of Egyptians, it is unlikely that they did.
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Figure 1:  Visualization of Entire Twitter Network on Egypt (nodes colored by community)18
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In order to filter out noise such as this, we used an algorithm developed by 
a group of statisticians to identify distinct clusters (or communities) within 
the network.19 This algorithm assigns users to different clusters based on 
a partition of users that yields the highest modularity score. Modularity is 
a measure of fit that compares the ties within and across clusters to what 
one would expect in a random graph of the same size and having the same 
number of ties.20 Formally, it is the fraction of internal ties in each cluster 
less the expected fraction if they were distributed at random across the net-
work. The higher the net fraction, the better the fit. The algorithm identified 
a number of distinct clusters in our data. Here, we focus on the cluster that 
included Al Arabiya and Al-Jazeera Arabic, because most of the users speak 
Arabic and are probably geographically close to the events in Egypt.
Analysis and Findings
The Al Arabiya and Al-Jazeera Arabic cluster is a far smaller subset (8,460 
users, 14,391 ties—see Figure 2) of our entire database, and thus more 
amenable to the use of most social network analysis algorithms. We began by 
estimating “betweenness centrality,”21 which measures the extent to which 
each actor in a network lies on the shortest paths (i.e., geodesics) connecting 
all pairs of actors in the network. It is often used as a measure of brokerage; 
here we use it to identify users who are potential conduits of information in 
the network. In Figure 2, the size of each node reflects that user’s between-
ness centrality score.
Al Arabiya and Al-Jazeera Arabic rank third and fourth respectively in terms 
of betweenness centrality. This is unsurprising since both are traditional “go 
to” sources of news and information, and we would expect them to be con-
duits of information about the Egyptian revolution. The Saudi user “Essamz” 
ranks second highest in betweenness centrality. This also was not a surprise 
Figure 2: Network Cluster Containing Al Arabiya and  
Al-Jazeera Arabic (nodes sized by betweenness)
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to us because he (Essam Al-Zamil) portrays himself as an activist who uses 
Twitter to start open conversations. Al-Zamil in fact recently created a new 
Twitter venture called Radwitter, which is a radio show that broadcasts about 
Saudi events and issues brought up on Twitter. The program’s goal is to facili-
tate discussion on the radio between activists and others who use Twitter.22 
Interestingly, the user who ranks highest in terms of betweenness centrality 
is a parody account (“HosniMobarak”) where the user poses as Hosni 
Mubarak, the president of Egypt who was overthrown in the course of the 
revolution. According to the user’s profile, he (or she) is located somewhere 
near or in Cairo, and the majority of the account’s tweets during the two 
days we studied were in English. A few examples appear below:
“I’ll be on TV soon to announce the new changes. First thing will 
be the replacement of the current people of #Egypt.”
“I survived 83 years, 6 assassination attempts, 2 major wars, and 
2 major revolutions. What makes you think I won’t survive this? 
#Egypt”
“Fool you once, shame on me. Fool you for 30 years, shame on 
you, your children, and your grandchildren. #Egypt”
“#Irony: Using the Internet, that I blocked earlier, I hereby an-
nounce my resignation as “President” of #Egypt.”
“Like I said in my TV statement, I will deliver the reforms I 
promised, I just didn’t say when. #Egypt”
“They say that what goes up must come down. But then again, 
I’ve defied every law there is. #Egypt”
It is interesting that while most of the fake Hosni Mubarak’s tweets were 
in English, the clustering algorithm we used still assigned him to a pre-
dominantly Arab-speaking cluster, indicating that in spite of the potential 
language barrier, his tweets received substantial airplay within a largely 
Arabic-speaking community. This suggests that his parody of the Egyptian 
president may have helped frame Mubarak as a corrupt and incompetent 
leader. This portrayal, conveyed with sharp humor, spread widely across 
the “Twitterverse,” with individuals from the Arabic-speaking community, 
the Netherlands, and elsewhere around the world retweeting his messages. 
The active spread of this negative imaging from individual to individual 
fits with social movement theory’s requirement for social consciousness to 
embrace common grievances. Of course, it is possible that many Egyptians 
already perceived their president in this way. If that was the case, then the 
fake account’s tweets would likely have reinforced the public’s perception of 
Mubarak, and were taking advantage of an existing political opportunity by 
attacking one of the regime’s vulnerabilities. In addition, when individuals 
posted tweets about the real Hosni Mubarak, they often included a link to 
the parody account, thereby directing even more attention to it. In either 
case, theory suggests that the widespread sharing of a common viewpoint 
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among a largely educated, middle-class population with access to resources 
may have contributed to people’s sense that the moment for change (oppor-
tunity) had come. 
To be clear, we are not suggesting that the fake Hosni Mubarak caused the 
events in Egypt to occur. As our earlier discussion of social movement theory 
should have made clear, a number of factors need to fall into place in order 
for a group of aggrieved individuals to mobilize, and even then there is no 
guarantee that they will. Nevertheless, our analysis does suggest that the 
parody’s tweets may have played a role in influencing the public’s perception 
of the president and thus given a boost to the movement. Without ad-
ditional data we cannot prove that this in fact happened. The results of our 
analysis, however, are consistent with such a deduction.
Conclusion
In this article, we have examined how social movements may be able to use 
Twitter to frame grievances in ways that resonate with their target audi-
ence. We saw how during the Egyptian Revolution, thousands of people 
used Twitter to discuss the events that were taking place. Using a clustering 
algorithm, we identified and focused on a particular cluster of Twitter users, 
the one that included the news organizations Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Ara-
biya. Using betweenness centrality to identify potentially influential nodes 
within this cluster, we discovered that a Hosni Mubarak parody account 
was quite central, and speculated that its tweets may have been influential 
in the framing of grievances during the Egyptian Revolution. By portraying 
the real Hosni Mubarak as corrupt and unwilling to give up power, it may 
have helped create or further a negative public perception of the Egyptian 
president.
This is not the only example of fake accounts that apparently tried to influ-
ence unfolding events during the Egyptian Revolution or elsewhere in the 
world. For example, during the Egyptian Revolution a fake Henry Kissinger 
(the former U.S. secretary of state) tweeted regularly, and attempted to 
portray Kissinger as a war criminal (e.g., his profile location displayed as 
“Anywhere but the Hague,” a reference to the location of the International 
Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice). Interestingly, this 
fake account often retweeted messages from the fake “HosniMobarak” 
account. Another example is the fake FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia) account (“FARC”). The FARC is a Colombian guerilla movement 
that was originally founded in 1964 to protect rural peasants against the 
harsh policies of large landowners, and provide the poor with education in 
exchange for food and supplies. It has since devolved into an international 
organization that now controls Colombia’s drug trade and often wreaks 
violence against the peasants it claims to protect.23 While the FARC has its 
own Twitter account (“FARC_Colombia”), the fake FARC account tweets 
about government victories against the FARC and atrocities committed by 
the FARC.  
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We should note that Twitter has a policy regarding parody accounts and 
impersonation accounts. It allows parody accounts as long as they make clear 
that they are a parody. Impersonation accounts, however, are not allowed. In 
fact, the “Henry_Kissinger” account discussed above has had to remove all 
of its tweets because it was deemed an impersonation rather than a parody 
account.24 While this policy will place limits on the long-term viability of 
impersonation accounts, they will most likely continue to spring up, and 
along with parody accounts, will help frame how others perceive various 
events around the world. Moreover, social movements, insurgencies, and 
other forms of collective action will almost certainly continue to use Twitter 
as a means of communicating with the faithful. 
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In today’s military, the word “professional” has become a catch-
all for anything good or worthy of praise. You’ll hear it used by a 
commander who, one suspects, is simply reaching for something—any-
thing—positive to say. “Very professionally handled,” the commander may 
intone with the utmost gravity, or, “Tom is a real professional in everything 
he does,” for want of a more artful compliment. Conversely, “unprofes-
sional” has become the go-to term for any negative appraisal of, well, just 
about anything for any reason at all. 
That’s not to say the term is meaningless. The idea of being a “professional” 
certainly gets at something in the collective consciousness of the military. 
But if, like me, you’ve noticed that it has become overused to the point of 
banality, you probably aren’t interested in thinking seriously about the term. 
If you are in the military, the concept may have had little direct impact on 
how you think of your military duties and service, despite the fact that most 
training or education you’ll undertake throughout your career will be what 
we call “professional military education.” 
Humor me then on a modest proposal. I think a better understanding of 
what the concept “professional” and its derivatives actually mean could 
affect our thinking on military service in a real and substantive way. 
Moreover, I think that the notion of being a professional—when properly 
understood—can provide some level of normative guidance on the ethical 
challenges facing military operators.
Classically, there were only three vocations that were considered professions. 
I used to tell my students this when I taught at the Air Force Academy, 
and then have the cadets guess what the three occupations were. For some 
reason they would at first invariably guess “blacksmith” or some other 
antiquated vocation. But eventually they’d hit upon the three “original” 
professions: medicine, law, and clergy. It’s worth exploring why this was the 
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case. Why were only doctors, lawyers, and “men of the cloth” traditionally 
called professionals? 
To begin, notice that each of these activities does something very important 
for an individual’s well-being. Doctors are entrusted by society to take care 
of physical health; lawyers are entrusted to uphold rights and legal standing; 
priests, rabbis, or pastors, and the like are entrusted with our spiritual 
well-being. Imagine you are an average person living several hundred years 
ago. You have a tremendous self-interest in assuring that these three critical 
aspects of life—your physical, legal, and spiritual health—are in good condi-
tion. Yet, the average human being, then or now, has no time to master the 
requisite specialized knowledge and skills that are needed to properly care for 
each of these aspects of life.
We see the idea of a profession born out of this societal need for some mem-
bers to take on these particular, specialized roles that are necessary for the 
well-being of all. Society trusts each of these sub-groups to be the guardian 
of its particular domain of expertise, and then to act on behalf of everyone 
else in the society. With that societal trust comes a heightened respect and 
dignity for these classic professions. But each also comes with special obliga-
tions and correlating special permissions. 
For example, since I am not a medical doctor, I am not entrusted by society 
to prescribe medications. That’s a unique permission that we give to doc-
tors who have met specified standards of training and expertise. Similarly, 
lawyers are trusted with the special permission of lawyer-client privilege. 
They can also argue in a court of law before a judge “past the bar”—that is, 
in the front portion of a courtroom past the small fence or piece of furniture 
(the bar) that traditionally divides the court between its working areas and 
areas where the public can sit and observe. (Hence, the term still used for 
admission into the profession of law is to “pass the bar.”) Clergy are given 
special permission to perform a wide variety of important rites according to 
their faith, that an average citizen generally cannot, such as marriages and 
funerals.
These permissions are granted to each profession for the purpose of carrying 
out that specific area of human activity with which that given profession is 
entrusted. But with each of these permissions also come distinct duties and 
obligations. If a doctor fails to meet the standard expected of her in car-
rying out her professional duties, she can be held liable for malpractice. If 
a lawyer is negligent in his counsel, he can be disbarred and himself pros-
ecuted. Clergy take on a wide range of special restrictions depending on the 
particulars of each religion, but they are almost always expected to put the 
well-being of their lay adherents ahead of their own. So we see that for each 
of the three classic professions, there is a special kind of bargain between its 
members and the society they serve. Each bargain comes with these special 
privileges that only the members of the given profession enjoy, and each also 
brings with it distinct duties that hold only for them. 
As we look closer, we discover other similar characteristics between the three 
classic professions. For example, notice that each is, in some sense, internally 
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self-regulated. They have their own unique ethical codes and sets of rules 
that society trusts them to enforce upon themselves. Doctors in some 
countries, including the United States, are “board certified” by an association 
made up of other doctors. Clergy members are typically ordained in some 
manner by their respective faith. U.S. lawyers, as noted, must pass a bar ex-
amination, which is administered by other attorneys in the state where they 
wish to practice. In all cases, this certification can be revoked by their peers 
within the profession. We also expect the three professions to continually 
improve the knowledge of their particular profession and to use it respon-
sibly for the benefit of the society. We all rightly presume, for example, that 
our family physician is at least reasonably up-to-date on the latest medical 
studies as they relate to our care. 
These days it seems we wish to call just about every occupation imaginable a 
“profession.” But I think that’s ungrounded. Most vocations, while valuable 
to society in their own right, don’t carry these distinctive features of the three 
classic professions. That is, while being a baker or a carpenter or a used car 
salesman may be indispensable to the functioning of society, none of those 
jobs should properly be characterized as a profession according to the classic 
criteria we just reviewed. So while it would perhaps not sound odd to our 
modern ears, it would technically be incorrect to call someone a “profes-
sional baker” or a “professional salesman.” 
So, then, let’s ask ourselves: should serving in the military be considered a 
profession? By listening to the language of the modern military, one would 
certainly think that is the default view. But is it an accurate claim based on 
what military servicemen and women actually do? Does the term “military 
professional” have the right fit with the concept’s classic meaning the way it 
does for a doctor? 
There are many ways that military service appears to have the right fit. The 
military is entrusted by society to carry out a particular highly skilled and 
specialized activity for the benefit of all: national defense. Just as with the 
three classic professions, the job the military is entrusted with generates its 
own peculiar duties and special permissions. The most striking special per-
mission is obvious: the permission to kill in war. The unique duties military 
members take on are also clear: to bear the largest burden of risk in war, and 
to accept a wide-range of restrictions placed on their personal liberty when 
they join.  
Looking closer, we see other parallels (and some points of disconnect) with 
the three original professions. Just like doctors, lawyers, and clergy, the U.S. 
military, for example, has its own set of unique rules (the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice) and its own ethical code. The UCMJ is internally enforced 
by the military hierarchy but, interestingly, it is imposed upon the military 
by an external body: the U.S. Congress. Notice as well that the military has 
its own unique process for bringing members into its body, just like the 
classic three professions do. Commissioning (or enlistment) has a parallel 
with ordination or passing the bar. But, again, it is the U.S. Congress that 
holds the final decision over who is commissioned as a military officer. So 
there are points of similarity with the classic professions, but also points of 
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dissimilarity in which the military’s autonomy over its own regulation is 
restricted.
The final commonality I noted was an expectation that members continually 
improve the knowledge of their particular profession and to use it respon-
sibly for the benefit of the society. This brings us back to that tired military 
idiom: professional military education. It seems there is good reason to 
interpret this as consistent with the demand on the classic professions for 
on-going competence in their given field. And, moreover, I think today 
there is an expectation from society that its military will be as up-to-date as 
possible not only on the knowledge of how best to wage war, but also how to 
conduct it justly.
Do all of these points of commonality with the classic professions mean 
that military service is properly a “profession”? I’ll leave that to the reader to 
decide. But if we take seriously the notion of military professionalism, then 
we would do right to remember what that actually means. “Professionalism” 
is not some catch-all synonym for praise or a job well done, as it is so often 
used in the military today. Rather, to be a professional means to take the 
trust that society has given you for this very particular (yet critically impor-
tant) vocation, and give that trust the proper weight and respect it deserves. 
If we do this, we might just return to things like “professional military 
education” with a new appreciation for the fact that the society one serves is 
counting on its military personnel to be competent, skilled experts carrying 
out their end of the noble bargain that being a member of a profession 
entails. Part of that bargain means our military members bear exceptional 
hardships. But it also includes being granted the unique and unsettling per-
mission to kill and destroy. That is no small thing with which to be trusted. 
Society today respects military professionals to a striking degree; one that 
at times borders on reverence. With that honor comes the responsibility for 
military members to properly value the trust society gives to the profession 
of arms.    
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Contemplating the Future of Social Media, Dark Networks, and 
Counterinsurgency1
STATE OF THE ART
“We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordi-
nate, and YouTube to tell the world.”
 —Cairo activist, Egyptian Arab Spring2
The spectacular growth in social media over the last decade, 
led by Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, and their potential usefulness have 
not been lost on insurgents and others using what we call dark networks.3 
Over the last few years, such groups have increasingly turned to social media 
to communicate with and motivate their followers and supporters. For 
example, the use of social media by Egyptian insurgents during the Arab 
Spring is well documented,4 and other dark networks, such as the FARC 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), have attempted to exploit 
their functionality as well. At the same time, authorities have been seeking 
ways to capture the information that dark networks share through social 
media. To date their efforts have yielded minimal returns, but there is good 
reason to believe that this could change in the future.
Speculating about the future is almost always a tenuous endeavor, and 
contemplating the interplay of social media, dark networks, and counterin-
surgents is no exception. I’ll limit myself here to discussing three of many 
possible scenarios: the use of social media by insurgents to communicate 
and disseminate information; social media’s value for authorities who track 
and disrupt dark networks; and the ways both insurgents and authorities use 
social media to frame and reframe discontent.
Communication and Diffusion
Scholars have long highlighted the importance that communication net-
works play in the mobilization of insurgencies and other social movements. 
“For example, the communication channels that were long embedded in 
African American churches and historically black colleges were employed to 
help coordinate communications in the black civil rights movement of the 
1950s and ‘60s;” more recently scholars have noted that the internet, satellite 
broadcasting, and cell phone technologies “have helped to mobilize and 
sustain various uprisings, protests, and insurgencies since the 1990s.”5 Thus, 
it is not surprising that contemporary insurgencies, such as the FARC and the 
FSA, have turned to social media to help mobilize members and supporters. 
The FARC and some individual members have their own websites, while the 
group’s commander, Timoleon Jimenez, a relative newcomer to the world 
of social media, recently issued a series of tweets attacking the Colombian 
government, less than two weeks before peace talks were to begin.6 Similarly, 
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the FSA operates two Facebook accounts on which it posts information 
concerning its military operations; it also uses Twitter and YouTube to com-
municate with and disseminate videos to its followers.7
How insurgents and other groups use these media in the future will hinge, 
of course, on how social media evolve. It is a reasonable assumption that 
the platforms will only get faster, easier, and less expensive, making them 
even more attractive to insurgents. We can also be reasonably confident that 
insurgencies and other dark networks will attempt to remain on or close to 
the technological cutting edge.
That said, given how easy it is to track the posts, tweets, and video uploads 
of insurgent groups, it is surprising that they are so open about what they are 
doing and with whom they communicate. Moreover, one would expect that 
counterinsurgents would attempt to use such information to their advantage. 
For example, it seems logical that the Assad regime would regularly monitor 
the FSA’s online activity, since the information contained therein might 
offer them a strategic advantage in their efforts to better counter the FSA’s 
operations. It appears, however, that either the regime is unaware of the FSA’s 
use of social media, or it lacks the technological sophistication needed for 
monitoring the FSA’s activities in a timely manner. What this suggests is that 
until counterinsurgents develop the tools necessary to track how insurgents 
use social media, dark networks will continue to have the advantage.
Tracking and Disrupting
That the Assad regime appears unable to track the FSA’s on-line activities 
does not mean that others cannot or are not doing so, however. For example, 
the New York Police Department (NYPD) became aware that newer gangs are 
using social media to boast of their exploits and taunt rival gangs, and there-
fore have been able to monitor the gangs’ activities. “By capitalizing on the 
irresistible urge of these suspects to brag about their murderous exploits on 
Facebook, detectives used social media to draw a virtual map of their criminal 
activity over the last three years.”8 In fact, by monitoring the conversations 
and trash talk between two rival gangs on Facebook, the NYPD was able to 
arrest 49 gang members on homicide and other criminal charges.9 
What this suggests is that by tracking social media posts and uploads, 
not only can authorities be alerted to significant events and uncover self-
identified perpetrators, but they can also identify key members through the 
use of analytical methods such as social network analysis.10 For example, as 
my colleagues and I discuss in our article “Mining Twitter Data from the 
Arab Spring” (in this issue), network data culled from publicly available 
micro-blogging tools such as Twitter can help analysts and operators identify 
individuals worth tracking, and ideally improve knowledge of the network. 
This kind of knowledge is essential to improve the crafting of disruption 
strategies over time:
In the successful strikes against al Qaeda affiliates in Singapore, 
Morocco, and Saharan Africa, the key doctrinal approach was to 
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wait and watch for a considerable period, then to swarm the targets 
simultaneously at their moment of maximum illumination. This 
strategic patience grew out of the understanding that striking at 
nodes as they were identified might actually reduce the ability to 
detect and track other cells in the networks in question. It is a curious 
fact [that]… the more that is disrupted, the less may be known.11
Using social media to track and ultimately disrupt dark networks will, of 
course, turn on the ability to scrape social media data in near real-time. 
While techniques for doing so are in their infancy, analysts, for example, 
recently developed a program (NodeXL) designed for pulling network data 
from social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, YouTube, 
and so on.12 More recently, Russell Shepherd and Patrick Dudas helped the 
Defense Analysis Department’s CORE Lab at the Naval Postgraduate School 
create a tool for gathering publicly available Twitter posts in near real-time. 
The Lab recently used this tool to track the social media use of the FARC, the 
FSA, the Taliban, the Omari Battalion, and others dark networks, as well as 
anti-regime protesters in Egypt.
It is hard to imagine that insurgencies and other clandestine actors would 
continue to use social media if counterinsurgent analysts become increas-
ingly adept at tracking their movements and mapping their interactions. We 
can be sure, however, that the social media market will continue to evolve, 
and that current major players such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube may 
give way in turn to new sites that are easier and more convenient to use. 
It is also highly likely that insurgencies will turn to these newer media as 
counterinsurgents get a handle on older ones. Thus, it is possible to imagine 
a scenario where insurgents, or at least the successful ones, will stay one step 
ahead in the exploitation of social media functionality.
Framing and Reframing
Scholars have noted that discontent by itself does not produce insurgencies. 
To take action, people must believe that change is not only necessary but 
also possible. They need to be able to perceive, interpret, and explain a situ-
ation in such a way that compels them to mobilize.13 This is most effectively 
accomplished by budding insurgencies when they frame their core message 
in ideological snippets that resonate with their target audience.14 As we 
describe in our article on Egypt’s Arab Spring, it is easy to see the potential 
role that tools such as Twitter, with its 140-character limit on tweets, can 
play in the framing of grievances by insurgencies. A report published by the 
Project on Information Technology and Political Islam at the University 
of Washington concluded that social media played a role in framing the 
Arab Spring in three major ways: by shaping political debates, by spreading 
democratic ideas, and by facilitating online “revolutionary conversations” 
that often preceded major events on the ground.15
What has received less attention is the ways in which authorities can use 
social media to reframe discontent so that it is redirected in more benign 
directions. An example of the potential for reframing was recently illustrated 
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by a Twitter conversation in response to a Newsweek cover that featured two 
men with fists in the air under the headline, “Muslim Rage.”16 In an effort 
to promote a conversation about the cover story, which concerned riots that 
broke out in response to a film clip posted to YouTube lampooning Islam, 
Newsweek asked its readers to tweet their thoughts. What it got in response 
was an onslaught of comments that mocked both the Newsweek story and 
the Islamic rioters in the Middle East. One reader captured the general 
sentiment:
I think it was this unspoken communal desire to reclaim the 
initiative, not just from what was regarded as kind of a cynical 
and inflammatory cover from Newsweek, but also just from a 
terrible, terrible week. I mean, it had been a really disillusioning 
week, seeing the way that this movie was responded to in Muslim 
countries in the Middle East. Even if it was only a thousand 
people here and a thousand people there, seeing people take the 
bait so easily was depressing … I think for a lot of people it sort 
of restored their faith in the community, because, honestly, this 
should have been the response to this movie from the very start. 
It should have been mocked and then ignored (emphasis added).17
The dampening effect, if any, that these tweets may have had on the riots in 
the Middle East is difficult to determine, but they illustrate the potential of 
how social media tools, such as Twitter, can be harnessed to reframe discon-
tent, so that rather than resorting to violence, people can express their anger 
in public dialogue.18
Not only can social media be used to reframe discontent, however, they can 
be used to turn public opinion against popular insurgent movements as well. 
For example, Óscar Morales, a Colombian civil engineer, grew increasingly 
frustrated by the FARC’s human-rights abuses, so in 2008 he set up a Face-
book page called “One Million Voices Against the FARC,” whose motto was 
“No more kidnappings, No more lies, No more killings, No more FARC.”19 
His campaign not only helped attract attention to the insurgents’ indiscrimi-
nate use of violence, but it led to worldwide protests against the FARC.20 
Some analysts are beginning to imagine how social media can be used to 
alienate insurgent groups and other dark networks from the wider popula-
tion, a key aspect of counterinsurgency theory.21
Whither the Future?
So what can we say about how insurgents and authorities will attempt to 
capitalize on social media tools to further their goals? I think it is relatively 
safe to conclude that insurgents will continue to turn to social media to 
communicate and frame grievances, and if the past is any indication of the 
future, they will become increasingly sophisticated in doing so. This will 
place a heavy burden on those of us who seek to disrupt dark networks, to 
keep abreast of the latest social media developments. It is fairly certain that 
as we become more adept at tracking the movements of insurgents, terrorists, 
criminals, and others from information gleaned from social media outlets, 
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these actors will abandon old technologies in favor of new ones. The rewards 
for attaining and maintaining a high level of technological sophistication 
in the use of social media are high. The costs for not doing so may be even 
higher.   
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In the 2007 movie, L’ennemi Intime (Intimate Enemies), a cinematic tour 
de force of the French-Algerian War, some soldiers in a French company are 
ordered to take a fellagha, a captured insurgent out for a “walk in the woods” 
and dispose of him. During this walk, Saïd, a Harki (an Algerian fighting on 
the French side) in the company strikes up a conversation with the fellagha. 
Saïd discovers that the fellagha’s name is Idir Danoun, and that they both 
had fought at the battle of Monte Cassino. When the company stops for a 
rest, Saïd shares a cigarette with Danoun and asks him why he had joined 
the FLN guerrillas. Danoun silently takes the cigarette that he has just lit 
and, while Saïd watches curiously, lights the other end. Danoun then says, 
“Look at this cigarette. This is you. On one end is the French Army, on the 
other, the FLN. Either way, you lose. You don’t know who you are anymore. 
You’re no longer an Algerian. You’ll never be a Frenchman.”   
We know the fate of Danoun, who had chosen to side with the FLN. But 
the movie never reveals the ultimate fate of Saïd, who sided with the French 
Army. Was he killed in the war? Did he survive? We never know. Saïd’s role 
ends thus perfectly, neatly swept off the stage.
Harkis like Saïd have remained a vestige of the brutal French-Algerian War 
that all the protagonists sought to ignore, forget, or exterminate. Unlike 
Saïd, however, history and historiography do not always allow uncomfort-
able truths to be neatly swept off of the stage. It is in this context that the 
fate of the Harkis and the impact on their descendants are explored, in 
Vincent Crapanzano’s latest work, The Harkis: The Wound that Never Heals. 
Based on a combination of archival research and face-to-face interviews, 
Crapazano’s results are riveting. In a typical scene, Crapanzano observes 
that the father of a man named Boussad “speaks to no one. He just sits at 
home and stares into space.” (p. 116) This silence in Crapanzano’s interviews 
is pervasive. It speaks to the presence of memories that have nowhere to 
go. Crapanzano inquires if perhaps Boussad’s paternal uncle, who is often 
drunk, might be a willing interlocutor. Also to no avail: “What the use? The 
past is the past.” (p. 116) 
Throughout his work, Crapanzano makes extraordinary efforts to engage the 
old Harkis and record their stories to ensure that they do not simply vanish 
from the stage like Saïd. But, like the other protagonists in this war, these 
men would rather forget: “What’s the point? ... It’s over. It’s best forgotten.” 
(p. 9) Crapanzano, however, recognizes that it is often far harder to forget 
than to remember. Indeed, the lifeless stares into space, the depression, the 
drunken stupors, the psychoses, the apathy, the suicides, the violence, all 
suggest that, in fact, nothing has been forgotten. It is evidence that demands 
a verdict.
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During the French-Algerian War, the Muslim community was faced with a 
choice: join either the FLN insurgency, or the French Army as an auxiliary.  
As all students of insurgencies know, the only neutrals are dead ones. Indeed, 
Muslims often joined the French Army only after being forced to witness the 
slaughter of their family members en masse. All told, approximately 260,000 
Algerians of Arab or Berber descent served in various capacities in the French 
Army as Harkis.  
As the war drew to a close, the period leading up to the ratification of the 
Treaty of Evian (July 3, 1962) was a defining period for the Harkis. With 
Algérie Francaise quickly slipping away, the French Army was losing its ability 
to maintain order. In the midst of the transition’s chaos and confusion, the 
Harkis were told to return to their villages. Crapanzano recalls a conversa-
tion with Hacène, whose father, a Harki, was told by the French to turn 
in his weapon because he was going to be issued a more sophisticated one. 
Once he had done so, his father and the entire attachment were sent back to 
their village unarmed, with the understanding that with the Treaty signed, 
they would be protected. As the men had feared, this provision, however 
well intended, was totally unenforceable and proved to be an outright death 
sentence. Indeed, “some of the Harkis were sacrificed as soon as they entered 
the village.” 
Betrayal and abandonment run throughout the Harkis’ story. As with so 
much in Algeria, though, there was another side to it. Crapanzano reminds 
his readers that the French army did not always stand by in abject obse-
quiousness while this murderous rampage took place. Some, in fact, made 
heroic attempts to spirit their Harkis back to France. While one officer with 
whom the author spoke “simply denied knowing anything about it,” he 
found many more who, disgusted and dispirited, lamented their powerless-
ness in the face of negotiated defeat.   
For those Harkis who were fortunate enough to escape, life was anything but 
predictable. For most, however, emigration—which began in the summer of 
1962—began with a harrowing ride in the cargo hold of a ship to Marseille. 
Most had never even seen the ocean, let alone been on a ship. Upon arrival, 
the families were transferred by rail to military camps that had been hastily 
erected to accommodate the surge of refugees. Those unheated and rodent-
infested camps, according to Crapanzano, were representative of the deplor-
able conditions that most would endure for years. They were overseen by 
poorly trained, often unsympathetic and resentful admin-
istrators who thought their own careers had been brought 
to a dead-end by the assignment. Even once in France, the 
war’s dangers never subsided completely for the refugees, 
who were viewed with suspicion by the French even as 
they were pursued by the FLN with revenge in mind.
Whether or not one ever found his way out of these 
camps depended upon skills, qualifications, connections, 
and often a bit of luck. As Crapanzano explains, this 
reflected the dichotomy between French assimilation-
ists, who advocated settling Harki families throughout 
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France, and the isolationists who advocated 
keeping them separate from French society. 
Put another way, “The assimilationists wanted 
to make them French; the isolationists wanted 
them to disappear.”
The camps have long been closed and aban-
doned, but they serve as constant reminders 
of France’s imperial past and its consequences. 
Crapanzano, in his final reflections, addresses 
the monumental challenges in achieving for-
giveness and reconciliation; from France, the 
Harkis’ adopted country, and from Algeria, 
their native country. In both countries they 
exist at best as pariahs, at worst as traitors. 
Most of his interviews were with the children 
of the Harkis, many of whom experienced 
both the deprivations of the camps and the 
excesses of the camp administrators. Conse-
quently, they also bear the scars of their parents.  
Some have moved on with their lives, becoming writers, businessmen, doc-
tors, or lawyers. Others have become activists fighting for recognition of the 
sacrifices their parents made for the tricolore. But many, if not most, of the 
grandchildren are unemployed and living on welfare in subsidized housing. 
Tragically, today, this world is becoming more isolated, and its inhabitants 
are undergoing an “intensification of Muslim identity,” according to a report 
for the Institut Montaigne. 
Crapanzano has chronicled the story of the Harkis with a well-researched 
and heartfelt, deeply disturbing personal journey. He illuminates not only 
the immediate costs of the Algerian rearguard action, but the less known 
collateral damage visited upon those forced to make choices that meant only 
preserving one’s life for the moment. Insightfully written, this work skillfully 
shifts our focus in one of the great geopolitical conflicts of the twentieth 
century to the most elemental level, that of the individual.    
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2   Available at http://www.banlieue-de-la-republique.fr/
NOTES
1 All photos courtesy of the author.
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